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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON THE EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
DAMAGES THROUGH MARKET AND HEALTH IMPACTS
SEMPTEMBER 2018
KELLY LEIGH HELLMAN, B.A., ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
M.A., ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Jamie Mullins
Establishing effective environmental policies is of considerable importance
around the world and becoming more crucial as human activities continue to change and
impact natural resources. The design of effective policies requires knowledge of the
mechanisms through which markets and individual behavior respond to environmental
risks. The following research focuses on the empirical estimation of such responses in
the presence of environmental risk to inform policy decisions. I apply econometric
methods to a variety of environmental issues, including flooding, environmental
disasters, and air pollution. My findings provide important information regarding the
setting of future policies related to each issue.
In the first chapter, “Estimating the Economic Impact of Stormwater runoff in the
Allen Creek Watershed,” written with Jeffrey Wagner, Karl Korfmacher, Daniel Lass and
Bríd Gleeson Hanna, we develop an economic model for stormwater runoff control to
quantify one important part of the tradeoff between the desirability of development
versus the consequential environmental challenges and economic costs associated with
increased flooding risk. Developing a theoretical model and illustrating its application in

vii

the Allen Creek watershed, we account for heterogeneity in each parcel-level generation
of stormwater runoff to estimate the marginal implicit price of additional stormwater
runoff due to development on downstream property values. We translate this value to a
marginal damage figure specific to our study area and compare our results with a relevant
abatement cost estimate. Our comparison suggests a general result that policies
encouraging upstream abatement measures, such as retention ponds, are likely to be
economically efficient.
The second chapter, “Information and Environmental Disasters: Valuing Public
Perception Regarding the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill,” written with Patrick Walsh,
quantifies the value of risk-signaling information in the context of shoreline oil wash-ups
from the Deepwater Horizon (DWH) oil spill. We analyze sale price and volume
responses in Hillsborough County, Florida, which ultimately experienced no wash-ups.
This chapter provides insight on the types of information that are salient for the
capitalization of perceived risk into home values and highlights an additional avenue for
economic losses from environmental catastrophes that has often been overlooked. Our
results suggest that the net impact of the heightened risk of oil wash-ups on coastal
homes was a ~4% reduction in sale prices between two and eight months after the DWH
oil spill, with the largest impact of a ~7% reduction in prices occurring in August and
September 2010. The timing of these price impacts suggests that specifically relevant
information regarding risk, coming from a source of authority is critical in driving risk
perceptions and ultimate price effects in the real estate market. Finally, our results
suggest a total capitalized loss of $4.5 million which highlights the importance of
considering a more comprehensive definition of damages, specifically accounting for
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losses associated with public perception of risks, when compensating states and local
governments, as well as citizens, for losses due to environmental disasters.
In the final chapter, “Quantifying the Health Effects of Information on Pollution
Levels in Chile,” written with Jamie Mullins, we analyze a policy implemented by the
Government of Chile that institutes temporary measures to reduce negative impacts of
high levels of air pollution in the short run through both emissions restrictions and public
information campaigns. This policy includes public announcement of days for which
pollution is projected to exceed threshold levels, deemed ‘Episodes’. As Episodes serve
to both reduce air pollution and inform the public, this chapter separately identifies the
mortality reducing effects of Episode announcements acting through the channel of
information and avoidance behavior from the total effect of Episode announcements,
which includes effects attributable to improved air quality. We find that, holding PM10
constant, the estimated impacts of the Episodes’ informational effects have magnitudes
comparable to the estimated total effects of Episode announcements on the day of and
two days after an Episode announcement, indicating that information is playing a critical
role in the reduction of mortality following Episode announcements. Our results suggest
that little of the observed reduction in mortality following Episodes is attributable to
lower ambient air pollution in the most immediate days following an announcement,
despite the fact that air pollution does improve significantly following Episode
announcements. These results are important for informing the implementation of shortterm approaches for addressing spikes in air pollution in other major urban centers.
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CHAPTER 1
ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF STORMWATER RUNOFF
IN THE ALLEN CREEK WATERSHED
with Jeffrey Wagnerb, Daniel Lassa, Karl Korfmacherc and Bríd Gleeson Hannab
a

Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst
b
Department of Economics, Rochester Institute of Technology
c
Environmental Science Program, Rochester Institute of Technology

1.1 Introduction
The management of urban stormwater runoff is of increasing policy concern as
development, particularly the proliferation of impervious surfaces, increases. Stormwater
runoff occurs naturally; however, like many natural processes, stormwater flow can be
affected by human activities. Changes in land use, specifically the conversion of natural
landscapes to urbanized areas, have been found to significantly impact stormwater flow.
Increased impervious surface area (such as roofs and pavement) in watersheds has been
linked to changes in both the type and magnitude of stormwater flow. Watersheds
dominated by a subsurface stormflow regime prior to urbanization experience an increase
in runoff generated by overland flow due to increased imperviousness. Overland flow
occurs when the soil infiltration capacity and depression storage are exceeded. Increased
overland flow results in greater and more rapidly forming peak flows, or large volumes of
water being delivered to the stream channel over a short period of time, and lower
baseflow, which is water that flows through the soil to sustain streams over time (Dunne
and Leopold 1978).
These changes to the natural system have implications for both the water quality
and quantity in a receiving water body. The amplification of peak flows and creation of
new peak events can lead to channel overflow, causing the surrounding land area to
1

flood, especially downstream (Booth 1991 and Paul and Meyer 2001). Increased
flooding can have detrimental effects on riparian areas that are not adapted to a high
frequency of flooding. Increased peak flows alter the stream channel and cause visible
physical degradation as a result of changes in sedimentation and erosion patterns, and
decreased baseflow impacts aquatic organisms in the stream. Additionally, water quality
may decline in urban streams due to the large quantity of incoming runoff carrying urban
pollutants that may not experience the intense filtration that occurs during percolation
through the soil (House et al. 1993 and Paul and Meyer 2001).
In economic terms, the existence of damage from uncontrolled stormwater runoff
implies that the privately optimal rate of runoff exceeds the socially efficient rate of
runoff. In the absence of constraints, private parties that could abate runoff will only do
so to the extent that they privately benefit from their abatement activities. Since runoff
flows downstream, upstream developers and homeowners have little financial incentive
to abate runoff that causes damage to downstream properties. The absence of constraints
implies zero marginal costs for increases in runoff coming from one’s property; hence,
private parties tend to choose zero abatement investment in order to maximize the total
private benefits of their economic activities (development) that increase runoff volumes.
While abating urban stormwater runoff has both ecological and economic aspects
that must be considered in an optimal management strategy, our study focuses on the
economic property damage aspects. We adapt the basic economic model for pollution
control to stormwater management. This model indicates that the economically efficient
volume of runoff to abate in a watershed is a level that equates the marginal property
damage avoided to the marginal abatement cost. This model can be used to inform
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development decisions in a watershed. Given the optimal volume of runoff abatement,
planners can determine whether the abatement burden required to mitigate additional
development is both technically feasible and not so costly that it overwhelms the
economic benefits of the development.
Stormwater runoff can be controlled using centralized methods, decentralized
methods, or a combination of both. Centralized control methods include large-scale
efforts that are typically built downstream, like the creation of wastewater treatment
plants and city sewage or tunnel systems. In contrast, decentralized control methods,
such as adoption of site-specific best management practices (BMPs), focus on smaller
scale, dispersed mitigation efforts. BMPs help decrease the volume of stormwater runoff
downstream via upstream stormwater retention, promoting soil infiltration and improving
water quality by facilitating vegetative filtration. These technologies can also present a
cost-effective solution to runoff abatement (Braden and Ando 2012 and Cutter et al.
2008).
The costs associated with various abatement technologies include construction,
operation, maintenance, and land costs. While the literature agrees the value of land will
have the largest impact on the cost-effectiveness of various abatement technologies,
many studies estimate only the construction, operation and maintenance costs of different
BMPs (Thurston et al. 2003, Landphair 2001, Weiss and Gulliver and Erickson 2012).
Thurston et al. (2003) and Weiss, Gulliver and Erickson (2012) use Cobb-Douglas
functional forms to determine construction costs as a function of volume of stormwater
abated. For most of the BMPs considered, the marginal construction costs vary
substantially and decrease as volume abated increases. However, when including an
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estimate for the opportunity cost of land, Thurston (2006) and Cutter et al. (2008) show
that the cost-effectiveness of decentralized BMPs relative to centralized methods depends
largely on the value of the land being used for abatement.
On the stormwater damages side of the ledger, multiple studies show that there are
economic benefits from improving water quality. For example, Poor, Pessagno and Paul
(2007) use a hedonic model and estimate that reductions in water quality due to one
milligram per liter increases in total suspended solids and dissolved inorganic nitrogen
have respective negative impacts of 0.5% and 8% on home values. Using a similar
hedonic model but correcting for spatial autocorrelation, Walsh, Milon and Scrogin
(2011) find that residential stormwater management and aquatic plant control programs
can increase home values by 3-5%. An analysis by Netusil, Kincaid, and Chang (2014) is
closely related to our study in that they investigate how water quality in creeks near
residential property affects property values; using a hedonic price model, they find that
water quality does affect residential property values and that the effect generally
dissipates, as expected, with distance from the creek.
Consistent with the water quality literature, Streiner and Loomis (1995) and Sander,
Polasky and Haight (2010) use hedonic models to estimate the value of stormwater
quantity mitigation. While Streiner and Loomis (1995) find that the effect of flood
control is positive and worth 5% of property values, Sander, Polasky and Haight (2010)
find a much smaller positive impact on property values (0.29-0.48%) resulting from a
10% increase in vegetative cover within close proximity to homes. Similarly, Kadish and
Netusil (2012) examine the relationship between land cover types – trees, shrubs, water
and impervious surface areas – and sale prices of single-family residences in the areas
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surrounding these properties. With regard to tree canopy, they find that increasing
canopy increases a home’s sale value, but this benefit is less than the discounted
estimated cost of planting and caring for trees on a given property. They note, however,
that consideration of additional benefits from each tree, such as stormwater mitigation,
may result in incremental social benefits exceeding the incremental social costs. Finally,
Braden and Johnston (2004) summarize existing estimates for the value of flood
reduction and conclude that stormwater mitigation is worth 0-5% of property values
depending on the home’s location in the floodplain. Using these estimates from the
aforementioned paper, Johnston, Braden and Price (2006) study the impact of reducing
the size of the 100-year flood plain, ultimately determining that the downstream benefit
to stormwater management is between $40-$620 per developed acre.
Our study extends the above literature in two dimensions. First, while others have
examined residential economic property damage that arises from relatively infrequent
floods (i.e. 100-year events), our study estimates property damage from exposure to
regularly occurring stormwater quantity flows (average annual runoff). Second, we
believe ours is the first study to model this relationship in a manner that takes into
account the parcel-level potential to both attenuate upstream stormwater flow and
contribute to downstream stormwater flow. That is, our measure of stormwater runoff is
at the individual parcel level; it accounts for heterogeneity in each parcel’s generation of
stormwater runoff.1 We estimate the marginal damage of runoff for a small urbanized
1

Rosen’s (1974) seminal paper on hedonic modeling presents the theoretical underpinnings of first and
second-stage hedonic analyses. The first stage model relates prices of homes to characteristics of those
homes to estimate the implicit price functions, while the second-stage uses the marginal implicit prices
determined in the first stage to trace out the household’s compensated demand curve, or marginal bid
curve. At the optimal level of consumption, the marginal implicit price is equal to the marginal bid (Taylor
2003). In our study, we make the simplifying assumption that the marginal implicit price of runoff is equal
to the marginal bid to interpret our first-stage hedonic regression results as estimates of damage.
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watershed located primarily in the Town of Brighton, Rochester NY. The Town of
Brighton is considering impacts that the development of a large area of green space (87
acres) would have downstream. Our results help to answer this question by providing an
estimate for marginal property damage. Thus, our study helps quantify one important
part of the tradeoffs communities face when evaluating the desirability of development
(e.g., raising the tax base) versus the increase in environmental challenges and economic
costs that may result (e.g., greater harm from stormwater runoff).
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present our theoretical economic
model of urban stormwater runoff generation and its abatement. Our study area and data
are presented in Section 3. We then estimate the empirical model in Section 4 and
discuss the results. Section 5 presents an application of our results as we compare our
marginal damage estimate to marginal abatement costs from previous literature. Finally,
in Section 6 we discuss our conclusions and directions for future research.

1.2 The Economic Model
A fundamental economic challenge faced by urban planners is to balance the costs
of abating stormwater runoff with the benefits of doing so. While the abatement cost and
damage associated with urban stormwater runoff is a function of both quantity and
quality, and watershed managers must consider both of these aspects of stormwater
management, the model is simplified so that abatement cost and damage are functions of
quantity only. In focusing on the quantity aspect, the model assumes that abating
stormwater quantity will also indirectly mitigate stormwater quality effects (Laukkanen et
al., 2009).
Let the volume of uncontrolled stormwater runoff in the watershed be denoted by
6
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By the standard assumptions listed above, the first-order condition yields an interior
unique optimum—i.e., some but not all of the runoff would be abated.
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While we discuss the specific case of continuous abatement costs, complexities of stormwater
management plans and differences in costs associated with installing BMPs on various types of land in a
watershed could result in discontinuities. For instance, a stormwater management plan that uses various
BMPs and extends widely across a watershed could see jumps in costs at specific volumes upon switching
to new technologies to abate larger volumes or after the availability of less expensive land for BMP
installation has been exhausted.
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Before leaving the theoretical model, we note that the marginal abatement cost
could in theory be U-shaped rather than monotonically increasing. This could be the case
if the abatement technology features economies of scale over some range of RO but
diseconomies of scale over lower ranges of RO. These ranges capture both the
technology per se as well as the opportunity cost of the land being utilized in the
abatement technology (such as a retention pond). While the economies of scale from the
technology itself could dominate the opportunity cost of the land factor at relatively high
levels of RO ( i.e. low abatement rates) via a retention pond, at some point, we could
imagine the economies of scale being exhausted and/or overtaken by the opportunity cost
of land factor as RO falls (i.e. as abatement increases beyond some point). Our
theoretical model includes a simplifying assumption that we will be in the upward
sloping range of the marginal abatement cost function. Of course, it would be sufficient
to assume that the second derivative is non-negative.

1.3 The Study Area and the Data
The Allen Creek watershed is located in Rochester, New York, in southeastern
Monroe County as shown in Figure 1.1. The Allen Creek watershed (USGS Hydrologic
Unit Code 041401010703) has a drainage area of 30.6 square miles and is part of the
larger 224 square mile Lake Ontario Central Sub-Basin (Monroe County 2015a). Allen
Creek drains into Irondequoit Creek, which drains into Irondequoit Bay that ultimately
feeds into Lake Ontario. According to the US Geological Survey (USGS) and the
Monroe County Department of Health (MCDH), both the annual precipitation volume
and the frequency of large precipitation events have increased in recent decades in
Rochester.
8

Figure 1.1: The Allen Creek watershed study area in Rochester, NY, located in Monroe
County.

As a consequence, peak flows have increased while base flows have decreased in urban
streams. In particular, Allen Creek has experienced the same number of peak flows
between 1960-1980 as in 1980-2006; however, the later period experienced seven flows
that exceeded the rate of any flow in the former period. Additionally, comparison of base
flow patterns since 1980 between Allen Creek and other streams located in relatively
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rural areas revealed a strong decrease in base flows in Allen Creek that were not seen in
the rural streams (USGS and MCDH 2008).
Figure 1.2 shows a detailed view of the Allen Creek watershed and the study area.
The striped polygon in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 represents an 87-acre plot located in the Town
of Brighton that currently exists as open, undeveloped land. Being one of the few
remaining undeveloped areas in Brighton, this site has been proposed for commercial
development. Any change in land use/land cover at this site, specifically the conversion
of the existing herbaceous landscape to a commercial site, will have the greatest impact
on properties located downstream from this area. Thus, this study area is of interest for
two reasons. First, we are interested in estimating the marginal property damage to
downstream properties from current stormwater flows. Second, we can use the marginal
property damage estimate to forecast how property damage may increase downstream if
additional upstream development is approved and stormwater flows consequently
increase. The white polygons outlined by dotted lines in Figure 1.2 show the parcels for
homes included in the sample. These parcels are single-family homes (excluding
townhomes) located directly downstream from the potential development site to the end
of the creek (less than four miles). Allen Creek flows left to right as shown by the arrow
in Figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.2: Detailed view of the study area showing: parcels in the sample, the FEMA
flood zone, a local park (Corbett’s Glen) and shopping center (Pittsford Plaza) and Allen
Creek.

All homes in our sample intersect with the 100-year flood zone as designated by the US
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The hydrological analysis was
11

conducted using ArcGIS 10.2.2 software from ESRI and data from Monroe County for
the year 2011. The characteristics of the properties used in our hedonic model are
publicly accessible through the Monroe County Real Property Portal (Monroe County
2015b).
The final dataset of contiguous properties intersecting the FEMA flood zone for
Allen Creek consists of 182 parcels. The majority of the residences in the dataset are
located in the Town of Brighton (131 homes); 29 homes are located in the Town of
Penfield and 22 homes in the Town of Pittsford. Since the homes in our study are located
in a designated high-risk flood area, new homeowners must receive a copy of relevant
flood maps at the time of purchase, and homeowners requiring a mortgage are federally
mandated to obtain flood insurance. Additionally, some mortgage lenders require that a
homeowner have flood insurance even if the home is not located in a high-risk area
(FEMA 2017b).
The Monroe County Real Property Portal provides assessed values of residential
properties, which are the dependent variable in our hedonic model. For residential
properties, each town defines the assessed value as the market value of the home at some
uniform percentage of value, called the equalization rate (NYSDTF 2015). Since the
Towns of Brighton, Pittsford and Penfield all used equalization rates of 100 percent in
2010, the assessed values used in our model should reflect market value as estimated by
local assessors (NYSORPTS 2015). To estimate market value, local assessors account
for various external and internal property characteristics, including those that may
influence flooding on a property such as location on a waterfront and soil classification
(NYSORPS 2002, NYSDTF 2015). We look at a cross-section of home characteristics
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and assessed values in 2011. As of 2011, the Towns of Brighton, Pittsford and Penfield
reported the most recent town-wide reassessments occurred in 2008, 2010 and 2009,
respectively (Town of Brighton 2016, Town of Penfield 2009 and Town of Pittsford
2016). Therefore, we convert all assessed values to 2010 dollars using the US Federal
Housing Agency’s Housing Price Indices for Rochester, NY metropolitan area (FHFA
2017).
For the independent variable of interest, we estimate the annual runoff from each
parcel using a spreadsheet model based on methods presented by Harbor (1994) and the
Long-Term Hydrologic Impact Analysis (L-THIA) model (Pandey et al. 2000, Choi et al.
2003, Purdue 2011, and Ahiablame, Engel and Chaubey 2012), which are based on the
Natural Resources Conservation Service’s (NRCS) Curve Number (CN) method (SCS
1986). Our spreadsheet incorporates 50 years of daily precipitation records for the
specified area. We assign a residential CN to each parcel in the sample based on the size
of the parcel, the hydrologic soil rating (see Table 2-2a from SCS (1986) for predefined
land use and soil CN combinations), and percentage of impervious land cover.
Hydrologic soil ratings are obtained from the Monroe County, NY SSURGO 2.2
database, downloaded from the NRCS Geospatial Data Gateway (NRCS 2015). CN
values range from 46 (two acre parcels on A soils) to 92 (an eighth of an acre or less
parcels on D soils). Most soils in the area are poorly drained (D) and each parcel is
intersected with the soils database in ArcGIS to determine area weighted CN values for
mixed soil parcels. Using ArcGIS 10.2.2 and L-THIA, we calculate runoff volumes
coming from each property based on the assigned CN. This runoff volume represents
annual excess precipitation not absorbed by the soils and land cover of the parcel. We
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then assign each property a number indicating its relative location downstream from the
potential development site to measure the volume of runoff that potentially accumulates
at that property from upstream properties. This generates a sequential variable assigned
to each parcel that is used to determine the annual cumulative runoff volume passing each
downstream parcel. Annual cumulative runoff volume is the sum of all upstream runoff
volumes plus the current parcel runoff. This volume reflects runoff losses attributed to
groundwater recharge, storage, and other losses.

1.4 The Empirical Model and the Results
We use a hedonic property model to estimate the marginal implicit cost of an
additional unit of runoff on a homeowner’s property. Recent studies utilize such a model
to measure the change in market property value resulting from changes in nearby water
quality (Leggett and Bockstael 2000, Poor, Pessagno and Paul 2007, and Netusil,
Kincaid, and Chang 2014), whereas our model examines the change in assessed property
value resulting from changes in average annual runoff quantity. Previous research
supports the hypothesis that location within a flood zone is a disamenity as it signals
flood risk to homeowners (Bin, Kruse and Landry 2008 and Nyce et al. 2014). In
addition to the information provided by flood zone designation, we expect information on
the frequency and severity of flooding that a parcel experiences should influence a
property’s value. Homeowners can observe site-specific differences in runoff volumes
during peak events as evidenced by water levels in embankments and their yards. Since
downstream location in a flood zone is correlated with higher runoff volumes, we use
runoff volumes to represent the flooding frequency and severity experienced by each
parcel. Several floods leading to significant property damage occurred on Allen Creek
14

between 1998 and 2008; therefore, homeowners in our study are likely to have
experienced flood events on their properties (USGS and MCDH 2008).
The use of sale value as a proxy for market value of residential properties is more
common and the preferred measure of value in hedonic models, however, assessed values
provide an alternative proxy for market value. While there are some potential problems
associated with using assessed values (see Taylor (2003), for example), in our analysis
the use of 2011 sale prices for homes located downstream from the potential development
site and in the floodplain would substantially restrict the number of homes in our sample.
Since L-THIA incorporates 50 years of precipitation data, we are unable to employ a
repeat sales approach as we would not be able to capture any variation in the average
annual runoff variable for relevant sales between 1961 and 2011. Additionally,
expanding our cross-section to single family parcels located outside the flood zone
requires future research in the form of a terrain analysis to construct a measure of runoff.
We are confident the runoff from homes located in the FEMA flood zone flow to Allen
Creek; however, without examining further hydrological models, we cannot be certain
runoff from properties outside the flood zone does not flow to other channels. Finally,
our study is focused on balancing the additional cost the Town of Brighton would incur
from flooding due to development with the additional revenue the town could generate
from taxing this new development. Therefore, in estimating the cost of additional runoff
via a change in assessed home values, we offer the town an estimate of the potential
reduction in property tax revenues due to increased flooding.
Typically assessed values are not exactly equal to sale values, which could result
in measurement error in the dependent variable of hedonic regression. As Taylor (2003)
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indicates, measurement error present in the assessed values leads to biased estimates of
implicit prices when the measurement error is correlated with the control variables. To
investigate the implications for using assessed values instead of sale values as the
dependent variable in our hedonic analysis, we run a simple linear regression with these
two variables for our area of interest. Using 48 single-family residence sales for
properties located along Allen Creek that sold between 2005-2010, we regress the sale
price for home i in year t (SVit) on the corresponding assessed value reported for home i
in year t (AVit). The estimated equation is shown below with standard errors in
parentheses:

=>?@ = 2355 + 1.032>?@
(15,282) (0.054)

(1.4)

The R2 for the model is 0.89 and the slope estimate is not significantly different from 1,
which suggests using assessed values as the dependent variable should not yield
significantly different results from using sale prices in our analysis. It is possible,
however, that sale prices differed from assessed values after the housing bubble burst in
2007 in the US. In this case assessed values may be less volatile during our study period.
We regress homes’ assessed values on various controls and parcel-specific
average annual runoff volume in cubic feet. We assume that assessed value (AV) is a
function of various home characteristics (X) and the expected annual property damage
associated with flooding (D), which is a function of average annual runoff volumes (RO).
Therefore, we have:
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2> = 2>(F, 4(!"))

(1.5)

Differentiating with respect to runoff volume (RO) and rearranging terms gives us an
expression for marginal damages:

$)
$&'

=

$%H
$&'

∙J

$%H LM
$)

K

(1.6)

Our regression model provides an estimate of the marginal effect of an additional 10,000
$%H
cubic feet of average annual runoff on the value of the home over its lifetime ($&' ). To
$)

obtain an estimate of the marginal annual damages ($&' ), we must make an assumption
$%H

about the capitalization of annual damages into home value ( $) ), which we discuss later
in the paper.
To estimate the change in assessed value caused by an additional 10,000 cubic
feet of annual runoff (which represents about a 2% increase in the average annual runoff
volume coming from each lot, see Table 1.1), we specify a log-linear functional form
similar to Poor, Pessagno and Paul (2007) and Netusil, Kincaid and Chang (2014). In
defining the empirical relationship between the runoff variable and assessed values, we
run a Box-Cox test. The test rejects the linear, log-linear and multiplicative inverse
specifications; however, the log-linear model has the lowest chi-squared value, providing
relatively more support for this model over the others. We specify the following hedonic
model:

NO2>? = P + QM F? + QR !"? + S?
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(1.7)

where LNAVi is the natural log of assessed value for home i in 2010 constant dollars. The
parameters to be estimated are α, β1, β2 and εi is a random disturbance term. Xi is a vector
of characteristics for home i and ROi is the average runoff volume in 10,000 cubic feet
that is transported by Allen Creek past home i's property annually. This volume is
directly related to downstream location on the creek and varies at the parcel level. For
instance, lower volumes of runoff are transported past homes located more upstream
relative to downstream homes. The variables used in our regression are described and
summarized in Table 1.1.
We estimate a number of models using ordinary least squares (OLS) that include
different controls. In our preferred specification, the structural characteristics include the
year in which the house was built (YRBUILT), the living area in square feet (LIVING),
and the yard space on the homeowner’s lot in square feet (YARD). Additionally,
quadratic terms for living area and yard space capture the non-linear relationship that
typically exists due to the diminishing marginal utility of an increase in living area and
yard space. Most of the residences are located in the Town of Brighton, but some are
located in the Town of Pittsford or Penfield. The dummy variable (PITTSPEN) indicates
those residences located in the Town of Pittsford or Penfield.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics for variables used in regression analysis.
Variable
AV10
LNAV10
STORIES
BEDS

Description
Total assessed value
(2010 dollars)
Natural log of total
assessed value
Number of floors

Number of bedrooms
Number of full
BATHS
bathrooms
Location: 1 if in
PITTSPEN Pittsford or Penfield;
0 if in Brighton
YRBUILT Year home was built
Living area (square
LIVING
feet)
Yard space (square
YARD
feet)
Average annual
volume of runoff
RO
from each lot (10,000
cubic feet)

Mean

Standard
Deviation

$280,614

$200,867

12.37

0.55

10.82

14.04

1.67

0.45

1

2.5

3.63

0.88

1

7

2.04

1.00

1

5

0.28

0.45

0

1

1947

19.40

1826

2007

2,462

1,134

1,050

7,361

29,914

31,730

4,863

249,437

466,262

354,768

4,803

1,136,251

Minimum

Maximum

$50,000 $1,250,000

Recall that the runoff variable (RO) is the average annual runoff volume that is
transported by Allen Creek past home i's property, based on 50-year precipitation
records. Since the hedonic model is log-linear, the effect of increasing runoff on home
i’s assessed value is QR ∙ ∆2>? . We evaluate the change in assessed value due to an
additional 10,000 cubic feet of annual runoff at the average assessed value in the sample.
We then multiply by our assumed capitalization rate (to be discussed shortly) to get the
annualized marginal damage of an additional 10,000 cubic feet of runoff and by 182 to
get the marginal damage to the downstream community. Because the potential
development site had yet to be developed by 2010, the results of the hedonic model
represent the damages due to runoff from the site existing as an herbaceous field. Thus,
we follow our estimation of the marginal property damage in the current development
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state with analysis of what those damages might be, should the upstream site undergo the
proposed development.

Table 1.2: Sensitivity of OLS results on cumulative runoff impacts.
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
Constant
PITTSPE
N

5.3738 ***
(1.9048)
0.1461 **
(0.0705)

STORIES

0.1753 **
(0.0427)

BEDS

-0.0438 **
(0.0191)

BATHS

0.0491 **
(0.0225)

YRBUIL
T

7.1140 ***
(1.9773)

10.8303 ***
(0.0846)

0.0646
(0.0683)

0.1077 *
(0.0642)

0.2702 E -2 ***
(0.9539 E -3)

0.1894 E -2 *
(0.1007 E -2)

LIVING

0.7327 E -3 ***
(0.635 E -4)

0.7712 E -3 ***
(0.591 E -4)

0.758 E -3 ***
(0.607 E -4)

LIVINSQ

-.0.584 E -7 ***
(0.809 E -8)

-0.573 E -7 ***.
((0.834 E -8)

-0.544 E -7 ***
(0.866 E -8)

YARD

0.578 E -5 ***
(0.132 E -5)

0.605 E -5 ***
(0.135 E-5)

0.552 E -5 ***
(0.136 E-5)

YARDQ

-0.182. E -10 ***
(0.497 E -11)

-0.198 E -10 ***
(0.500 E -11)

-0.174 E -10 ***
(0.499 E -11)

RO

-0.117 E -2 *
(0.635 E -3)

-0.156 E -2 **
(0.714 E -3)

-0.192 E -2 ***
(0.72 E -3)

Adj. R

0.91

0.90

0.90

Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. The sample size is 182 for
all models, and the runoff variable reflects the marginal effect of an additional 10,000 cubic feet of
average annual runoff on the value of the home over its lifetime.
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level or better.
** Statistically significant at the 5% level or better.
* Statistically significant at the 10% level or better.
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Model estimates using OLS including the indicated controls are presented in
Table 1.2. Each model includes heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors as the
Breusch-Pagan test suggests the presence of heteroskedasticity in the data. Coefficient
estimates on the runoff variable are similar across models. The adjusted R2 values for
Models 1-3 are nearly identical; however, Model 3 is the most parsimonious. That
assessed values are being explained by relatively few exogenous variables is not
surprising, given the study area spans less than four miles. Given the use of a relatively
small area in our analysis, we expect there is likely to be little spatial variation in
amenities beyond what is captured by the town dummy variable.3 Nevertheless, to ensure
that spatial dependencies are not driving our results, we explicitly address such spatial
correlations in the data (as recommended by LeSage and Pace (2009)).
Using Model 3 as the preferred specification, we test for spatial dependence under
the assumption of a contiguity-based spatial weight matrix (SWM), which defines parcels
that share a border as neighbors. The Moran’s I statistic on the OLS residuals is
significant at the ten percent level, suggesting that failure to correct for spatial
autocorrelation could result in inconsistent or inefficient estimates using OLS. Therefore,
we estimate the following general spatial model, which contains both a spatial lag term
and non-spherical error (LeSage and Pace 2009):

U = VWM U + XQ + Y

(1.8)

Y = ZWR Y + S

3

We also run models that include additional spatial variables, such as the distance to a nearby park and the
distance to a main shopping center. These variables are not statistically significant, and their addition does
not result in any change in the runoff coefficient.
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In equation (1.8), Y is the dependent variable, W1 and W2 are SWMs, Z is a matrix of
exogenous variables (including home characteristics and the runoff variable in our
model), β is a vector of estimated coefficients associated with Z. ρ and l are the
estimated spatial coefficients capturing the spatial lag and non-spherical error term,
respectively. ε is a vector of random disturbances distributed i.i.d. normal. Since our
data exhibit heteroskedasticity, we estimate this model using generalized spatial twostage least squares. Assuming the same structure for W1 and W2, our results indicate that
ρ is statistically insignificant while l is statistically significant, suggesting that the data
generating process is more aptly modeled with a spatial error model.
Table 1.3 reports the spatial error model coefficient estimates along with those
from the preferred OLS specification (see Model 3 in Table 1.2). According to Table 1.3,
home characteristics, location and runoff are estimated to have important effects on
assessed values in the spatial model. All estimated parameters are statistically significant
at least at the five percent level of significance. While most homes are located in the
Town of Brighton, the 51 homes in Pittsford or Penfield are estimated to have 16 percent
higher assessed values when compared to Brighton assessed values according to the
spatial error model.4

4

Because the dependent variable is the natural log of assessed home values and the variable in question,
PITTSPEN, is a dummy variable, (exp(β)-1)*100 is the estimated percentage difference change in assessed
values for homes in Pittsford and Penfield relative to similar homes in Brighton, where Q is the PITTSPEN
parameter estimate (Halvorsen and Palmquist 1980).
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Table 1.3: Hedonic model results estimated using spatial error model
compared to OLS.
Variable
OLS
Spatial Error
Constant
PITTSPEN
LIVING
LIVINGSQ
YARD
YARDSQ
RO

10.8303 ***
(0.0846)
0.1077 *
(0.0642)
0.758 E -3 ***
(0.607 E -4)
-0.544 E -7 ***
(0.866 E -8)
0.552 E -5 ***
(0.136 E-5)
-0.174 E -10 ***
(0.499 E -11)
-0.192 E -2 ***
(0.72 E -3)

Lambda

10.8562 ***
(0.0893)
0.1526 **
(0.0741)
0.7669 E -3 ***
(0.621 E -4)
-0.589 E -7 ***
(0.924 E -8)
0.511 E -5 ***
(0.156 E -5)
-0.165 E -10 ***
(0.563 E -11)
-0.235 E -2 ***
(0.821 E -3)
0.0818 **
(0.0352)

Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. The sample size is 182
for all models, and the runoff variable reflects the marginal effect of an additional 10,000 cubic
feet of average annual runoff on the value of the home over its lifetime.
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level or better.
** Statistically significant at the 5% level or better.
* Statistically significant at the 10% level or better.

The positive estimated neighborhood effect likely represents the effects of higher median
household income in Pittsford and Penfield. Median household incomes in the towns of
Brighton, Penfield, and Pittsford are $63,353, $78,069, and $104,575, respectively (US
Census Bureau 2015). Additionally, the coefficients on the household characteristics
(living area and yard area) have the expected signs and are of reasonable magnitude. The
spatial error model indicates assessed values increase at a decreasing rate for both
additional living area and yard area.
The estimated effect of annual stormwater runoff is of primary interest in this
study. The estimated marginal damage effect can be used to determine the optimal level
of stormwater runoff when compared to marginal abatement costs. As described above,
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the variable measuring stormwater runoff is a cumulative measure aggregating upstream
runoff for each property that captures annual excess precipitation not absorbed by the
soils and land cover of the parcel. The estimated marginal effect of annual stormwater
runoff volume on home values is negative. Table 1.4 summarizes the estimated impact of
an additional 10,000 cubic feet of annual stormwater runoff based on the spatial error
model estimates. Row 1 of Table 1.4 represents the estimated impact of an additional
10,000 cubic feet of annual runoff on assessed value.

Table 1.4: Estimated impacts of an additional 10,000 cubic feet of runoff.

Spatial Error
RO Coefficient
Impact on Average Valued
Home (2010$)
Damages to Downstream
Community (2010$)
Downstream Damages per
10,000 ft3 Due to Additional
3.94 mil ft3 Runoff (2010$)

95% Confidence Intervals
Lower Limit
Upper Limit

-0.235 E -2 ***

-0.074 E-2

-0.396 E-2

-659

-208

-1,111

11,994

3,786

20,220

4,725,636

1,491,526

7,966,759

Note: Sample size for all models is 182. Impact on average valued home is the coefficient
estimate multiplied by $280,614. Damages to the downstream community are calculated by
multiplying the impact on the average valued home by the sample size and then by the
capitalization rate (-0.10). Downstream damages due to an additional 3.94 million cubic feet
of runoff is based on the L-THIA estimate of additional expected runoff beyond current
conditions if the 87-acre herbaceous field is commercially developed. This is calculated by
multiplying the damages to the downstream community by 3.94 million cubic feet of runoff
(recall the coefficient estimate is in 10,000 cubic feet).
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level or better.

The spatial error model suggests an additional 10,000 cubic feet of annual
runoff reduces assessed values by about 0.235 percent (the 95% confidence interval is
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0.074-0.396%). The effect is statistically significant at the one percent level. Estimates
of partial effects on assessed value change with assessed value. For example, a home
assessed at $150,000 would have a reduction in value of $353 from an additional 10,000
cubic feet of annual runoff, and a home assessed at $1,000,000 would have a reduction in
value of $2350 from an additional 10,000 cubic feet of annual runoff. As indicated by
row 2 of Table 1.4, the impact of an additional 10,000 cubic feet of annual runoff on
assessed value for the average valued home ($280,614) is $659. The increasing impact on
home values is expected as damage to homes with higher assessed values are likely more
costly to repair.
The estimated marginal runoff effect is statistically significant, but is the effect
economically significant? There are several important considerations when determining
the economic effects of additional annual runoff. First, the marginal damage function is
the aggregate of damage to all properties that will be affected by land-use changes
upstream. Thus, the marginal damage incurred by all downstream properties (182 homes
in this analysis) must be aggregated to determine the marginal damage function for the
project under consideration. Second, the estimated effect of additional annual runoff
represents annual marginal damages that have been capitalized into home values. To
$)

obtain an estimate of the marginal annual damages ($&' ), we assume a capitalization rate
of 10%, meaning that each additional loss of $10 in home value is equivalent to a $1
increase in expected annual damages from runoff. Use of this rate is based on a hedonic
study by Nyce et al. (2014). Nyce et al. (2014) find that for homes located in MiamiDade County, Florida, a 13.04 percent increase in average annual flood insurance
premiums results in reduced home values by between $2,316.82-$4,571.45, implying a
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capitalization rate of between 7 and 14 percent. This is a relevant measure because an
annual expected increase in damages due to runoff leads to a permanent change in
housing value. Our model estimates the permanent change in housing value, which must
be transformed into an estimate of annual damages. Thus, we assume the final term in
$%H LM

equation (1.6) is J $) K

= -0.10 and use this value to convert the estimate of housing

value change into an annualized marginal damage value.
The estimates of aggregate annual marginal damage to the downstream
community shown in row 3 of Table 1.4 are the estimated impact on the average
downstream home’s assessed value (Table 1.4 row 2) multiplied by the number of
affected properties (182) and the capitalization rate (to create annual values). After
accounting for spatial effects, the annual estimated marginal damages for all 182
downstream homes facing typical stormwater runoff events in this region is nearly
$12,000 per 10,000 cubic feet of additional runoff (or $1.20 per one cubic foot).
Confidence interval estimates are also provided. We are 95% confident that the true
marginal damages of 10,000 cubic feet of additional runoff is contained by the interval
$3,786 to $20,220. Finally, consider the aggregate damages of developing the upstream
87-acre parcel. The estimated downstream damages due to an additional 3.94 million
cubic feet of runoff shown in Table 1.4 is based on the L-THIA estimate of additional
expected runoff beyond current conditions if the 87-acre herbaceous field is
commercially developed. The estimated damages to the community from an additional
3.94 million cubic feet of runoff is roughly $4.7 million and the 95% confidence interval
ranges from $1.5 million to $8.0 million.
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1. 5 Damage and Abatement Cost Comparison
While our study does not generate abatement cost estimates, we illustrate the use
of such an estimate of the marginal annual downstream property damages by comparing
our estimate to marginal abatement cost data that can be considered roughly comparable
across communities and across time. For example, Thurston et al. (2003) report
construction cost functions for various BMPs estimated by Schueler (1987) and Heaney,
Sample, and Wright (2002). For cost comparisons, we consider a scenario in which the
Town of Brighton requires the installation of a 100,000-cubic foot capacity retention
pond on the upstream development site. Using the total cost function for a 100,000-cubic
foot or larger retention pond given by Thurston et al. (2003), we calculate the marginal
cost of abating an additional 10,000 cubic feet of runoff downstream as $3,800 (2010
dollars). This is a one-time construction cost for a retention pond that we expect will
abate runoff years into the future. If for example, the expected life of the pond is 35
years, then we would have an annual cost of $3,800/35 years = $109 per 10,000 cubic
feet (setting aside the discounting, for simplicity) to compare with our annual figure for
marginal damage. Discounting would reduce the annual marginal cost per 10,000 cubic
feet estimate, depending on the choice of discount rate. Discounting aside, in our
example of installing a 100,000-cubic foot retention pond, we calculate the marginal
abatement cost at $109 per 10,000 cubic feet of runoff abated. Comparing this marginal
cost to our marginal damage figure of $12,000 per 10,000 cubic feet provides a back-ofthe-envelope estimate for how the benefits of stormwater control compare with the costs.
While this suggests that under current conditions, it would be economically efficient to
abate additional stormwater runoff, we hasten to add that the above compares only the
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construction cost associated with installation of the retention pond. A more
comprehensive cost comparison would reflect additional costs specifically faced by the
Allen Creek community and should include the cost of land devoted to the retention
pond, any effects of the pond or construction on surrounding property values, and any
additional annual insurance, operating, and maintenance costs. It is possible that an
updated marginal abatement cost estimate may increase our cited figure so much that it
becomes larger than our estimated marginal damage. Depending upon the assumptions
one might make about the curvature of the marginal abatement and marginal damage
functions, the community under study may certainly find that it is welfare-enhancing to
increase household-level stormwater abatement efforts. To our best knowledge, there are
no studies that provide marginal abatement cost estimates that consider the opportunity
cost of land or provide cost functions to account for location-specific factors. Thus,
further research is warranted to refine these empirical estimates for a more meaningful
comparison. We mention this comparison to illustrate how our property damage
estimation methodology can contribute to more complete assessments of the economic
efficiency of stormwater abatement in particular communities.

1.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this study is to propose a multidisciplinary methodology for
estimating marginal property damage from routine stormwater runoff events in small
watersheds. To pursue this goal, we combine economic and environmental science tools
from the literature and extend those tools from the area-level to the individual parcellevel of analysis. Thus, our study makes two contributions. First, while other studies
have estimated property damage that arises from relatively infrequent floods such as 10028

year events, we estimate property damage from exposure to regularly occurring
stormwater quantity flows (average annual runoff). Second, we believe our model is the
first to take into account the parcel-level potential to both attenuate upstream stormwater
flow and contribute to downstream stormwater flow. Therefore, the estimates we obtain
from our approach reflect each individual parcel’s runoff contribution and anticipated
damages based on its location (upstream or downstream) relative to other properties.
The key empirical take-away for the community under study is that marginal
annual property damage from an additional 10,000 cubic feet of routine stormwater
runoff is on the order of $12,000 (or $1.20 per one cubic foot). Our comparison of this
damage figure with a representative abatement cost figure based on the literature ($109
per 10,000 cubic feet of runoff abated) suggests that expansion of decentralized BMPs
such as upstream retention ponds in this small urbanized watershed is almost surely
economically efficient.
There are many additional directions for future research. First, we focus on
stormwater volume here and its impact upon assessed property values. However, runoff
generates changes in local water quality as well. Hence, extensions of the model should
take both quantity and quality into account. Second, methodologies that allow for more
complex analysis of surface hydrology could be used to generate a richer data set that
includes homes located inside and outside the floodplain. Third, our estimate of the
damages based upon the first-stage hedonic regression analysis could be refined by
collecting additional data that would permit a second-stage hedonic analysis (for instance,
see Netusil, Chattopadhyay and Kovacs 2010).
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Finally, our study based on hedonic regression estimation is intended to
complement analyses based on estimated flood depth-damage curves. FEMA routinely
relies upon flood depth-damage curve analyses generated from its Hazus-MH software
because of their simplicity and the availability of housing stock data.5 We are not aware
of current FEMA flood depth-damage function estimates for the small urban watershed of
our interest in this study. We therefore anticipate seeing if such a function could be
estimated for our watershed using FEMA’s Hazus-MH software and comparing the
results. Indeed, FEMA suggests that projections from its Hazus-MH flood module
should not be considered comprehensive or used in place of local flood analyses to
determine economic and financial decisions. Rather, the Hazus-MH flood module is
intended to provide additional support in informing policy. Additionally, since the
HAZUS-MH damage estimates rely on data aggregated at the census block level, results
may be sensitive to aggregation bias and cannot incorporate variation in flood risk for
buildings included in the analysis (FEMA 2017a). In principle, we expect the results of
the two analyses to be reasonably close. However, the hedonic regression approach is
designed to consider heterogeneity of flood risk at the household level and a wider
variety of values at stake than a flood damage curve analysis is designed to capture.
Specifically, the flood damage curve analysis focuses upon monetizing general physical
damage to buildings and consequent repairs, whereas the hedonic regression approach
attempts to capture values including those for the disruption or enhancement of local
ecosystem services, aesthetics, and other non-market factors.

5

Pistrika, Tsakiris and Nalbantis (2014) provides an overview of depth-damage function methodology as
practiced in several countries.
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CHAPTER 2
INFORMATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS: VALUING PUBLIC
RISK PERCEPTION REGARDING THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL
with Patrick Walsh, Landcare Research, Auckland, New Zealand
2.1 Introduction
The direct costs imposed by environmental disasters are undeniably large and can
be devastating in both the short-term and long-term for local economies. Contingent
valuation studies on the largest marine oil spills in the US, the 1989 Exxon Valdez in
Prince William Sound, Alaska and 2010 Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico,
estimate the costs of these events at $2.8 billion (1990) and $17.2 billion, respectively
(Carson et al. 2003; Bishop et al. 2017). Despite these staggering figures, the impact of
these disasters may be undervalued if, in addition to actual physical damages, perceived
risks are capitalized into markets. Tanaka and Zabel (2017) show that public perceptions
of risk are an important determinant of property values near nuclear power plants in US
after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan. Other studies find that information
on proximal or recent natural disasters, such as hurricanes and floods, negatively impact
sale prices of residential properties that experience no direct environmental impacts,
demonstrating that individual perceptions of unrealized risk drive realized economic
losses in the real estate sector (Bin and Polasky 2004; Kousky 2010). Additionally,
media coverage and public announcements of nearby incidents can signal risk to markets,
thereby impacting sale values (McCluskey and Rausser 2001; Hansen, Benson and Hagen
2006). These studies indicate that information regarding risk is critical in determining
perceived risk levels, which are ultimately capitalized into market prices. Along these
lines, this paper examines the impact of information regarding oil wash-ups from the
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Deepwater Horizon (DWH) oil spill and identifies a significant price reduction among
coastal residential properties in Hillsborough County, Florida, even though no oil
ultimately came ashore within 200 miles of the county. The timing of the observed price
responses suggests that the authority of the source of information and the specific
relevance of the risk-signal both play important roles in determining the extent to which
risk surrounding environmental disasters is capitalized into markets. It is the
capitalization of risk through perceptions of market participants which drives the often
unrecognized, additional costs associated with environmental disasters.
The uncertainty surrounding the geographic extent of shorelines that would suffer
from oil wash-ups following the DWH oil spill provides a unique setting to analyze the
impact of public perception of risk on home prices. The goal of this paper is to quantify
losses in the real estate market resulting from the perceived risk of oil damage to local
shorelines in response to the flow of information regarding such risk. In a related study,
Hallstrom and Smith (2005) find that a “near miss” hurricane in Lee County, Florida
provides updated information on risk of hurricane damage, resulting in a 19 percent drop
in sale values of properties in a county that was ultimately not directly impacted by
Hurricane Andrew. Hallstrom and Smith (2005) characterize the lack of knowledge on
the impact of the hurricane as risk and quantify the value of learning from the occurrence
of disasters that happen in close geographic proximity.
Unlike the single informational shock of being nearly missed by a specific
hurricane, our analysis involves a more complex flow of information regarding the risk of
amenity damage, in this case of oil wash-ups. For Hillsborough County, the objective
risk of oil wash-ups began with the explosion on the DWH on April 10, 2010, and a great
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deal of information was released until the leak’s permanent containment on September
19, 2010. Between April and September, there existed significant uncertainty regarding
the amount of oil that was leaking into the Gulf, where it might wash up, and which
shorelines might be most affected. We assess both the value of specific informational
events and the broader period over which the total flow of public information contributed
to meaningful reductions in coastal housing prices in Hillsborough County. Our results
suggest that the perceived risk of oil wash-ups drove down coastal residential property
values by an average of 4% from July through December of 2010, of which the largest
and most significant price drop of nearly 7% occurred during August through September.
The timing of the largest price drops coincides with the release of two government
reports that detailed the magnitude of the DWH leak and the areas likely to face oil washups. The losses identified in this study are therefore consistent with price effects of
changing risk perceptions driven by a risk signal that was both authoritative (i.e.- from a
government source rather than a source with a commercial interest in minimizing the
severity of the leak) and included specific information for Hillsborough County. We also
examine the impact on sale volumes, though our results suggest that coastal sale rates
were unaffected.
We use a quasi-experimental research design to quantify the costs imposed by
shifts in public risk perceptions acting through real estate markets. With sales data on
single-family residences in Hillsborough County, Florida, we estimate both a hedonic
model and analyze sale volumes using a difference-in-differences framework in both
cases. This approach assesses the net effect of information regarding the DWH oil spill
on the sales of properties that derive significant value from the amenity of coastal
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proximity. Since coastal proximity has an amenity value that would have been
diminished by oil wash-ups, we identify our treatment group with a distance threshold,
which captures properties that gain significant additional value from being near the
shoreline. Our control group is non-coastal zone properties. As would be expected, our
estimates of the effects of perceived risk are smaller than the effects found by previous
studies of the costs of realized oil wash-ups from the DWH. In cross-sectional analyses
of condominium sales along oiled beaches in Alabama, Siegal, Caudill and Mixon (2013)
and Winkler and Gordon (2013) find reductions in sale values ranging from 5-13.5%.
Winkler and Gordon also estimate a 40% decline in sale volumes from July to December
2010.
To our knowledge, ours is the first study to use panel data methods to estimate the
damage imposed by perceived risk arising from the DWH oil spill and consider the value
of different types of information in the context of an environmental disaster. Therefore,
our results highlight both an additional avenue for economic losses from environmental
catastrophes that has often been underappreciated and contribute to the literature through
the assessment of a period of information flow over which risk perceptions are updated
and the housing market responds accordingly.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides background on the
DWH oil spill. Section 3 describes our empirical approach, and Section 4 presents our
main results. In Section 5 we conclude the paper.

2.2 Background
On April 10, 2010, BP’s DWH oil rig exploded after a well blowout in the Gulf of
Mexico, resulting in the unabated release of oil for 87 days before the leak was capped on
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July 15, 2010. Ultimately, the disaster resulted in the deaths of 11 workers, injury to 17
others and oil wash-ups along 1,300 miles of shoreline in Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama and Florida (Nixon et al. 2016). As the largest oil spill in US history, there
were many realized damages due to the spill, including physical and mental health
impacts, economic losses to businesses and individuals, especially in the fishery and
tourism industries, and the destruction of wildlife and natural habitats (Graham et al.
2011). Despite these immense losses, our study demonstrates additional losses imposed
by the perception of risk surrounding oil wash-ups. While the capping of the well in July
stopped the oil flow, the well was not permanently shut until September 19, 2010.
Therefore, between April and September, there existed considerable media coverage
surrounding the events of the spill. Much of the information reported included estimates
of the flow rate from the leaking well and continually shifting and updated predictions of
the movement of oil slicks and locations of likely wash-ups throughout this period.
Between April and August, however, the reported flow rates estimates were being
casually updated and were constantly in question. Additionally, until July, when the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provided specific
probabilities of wash-ups by location, reports of projected oil movement were mostly
vague and uncertain (Graham 2011).
Current studies report that shoreline wash-ups affected mostly beaches and coastal
wetlands. According to these assessments, 65% of oil wash-ups occurred in Louisiana,
which was the first Gulf state to experience wash-ups in late April and includes most of
the affected wetlands (BBC 2010; Nixon et al. 2016). The heavier persistent oiling of
beaches occurred in Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, while beaches in the Florida
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Panhandle experienced light persistent and transient oiling. Beaches in Texas
experienced only light oiling. Persistent oiling is defined as oil that lasted for more than
26 weeks as a result of lack of removal or the remobilizing and depositing of oil via
tropical storms and other weather patterns (Nixon et al. 2016).
While oil wash-ups began as early as the end of April for Louisiana, Florida saw
its first oil wash-up in the form of tarballs along its northwestern coast in Pensacola on
June 4 (Time Magazine 2010). Therefore, immediately after the spill until early June,
Florida residents may not have regarded wash-ups as directly relevant. Throughout June,
however, beaches in northwestern Florida continued to see wash-ups, and Escambia
County issued a health advisory for some beaches due to oil sheening and tarballs on
June 28 (Florida SERT 2017). Tarballs form when wind and waves break up heavy oils
that have become thick and sticky after mixing with water. The oil gets torn into pieces
that are typically the size of coins but can be as large as pancakes. Tarballs are not easily
broken down by the environment and can move across hundreds of miles. These create
an aesthetically unappealing beach scene, and NOAA advises against any contact as
individuals may be sensitive or allergic to the chemicals contained in tarballs (NOAA
2017).
In early July, reports focused heavily on where the oil was going and how the
upcoming hurricane season may impact the spill (Potter and Avram 2010). After
Hurricane Alex in early July, NOAA and other scientists predicted the remainder of the
hurricane season would see above average activity, which would cause the oil to move,
potentially resulting in more oil moving toward the coast. Since the specific storm paths
were unknown, however, it was also unclear which parts of the Gulf coast would be the
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most affected (Biello 2010).1 The most concrete information on wash-up risk came from
a report released by NOAA on July 2 indicating the probabilities of wash-ups for each
location along the Gulf Coast. This was the first official report to establish a non-zero
probability (between 1-20%) of oil washing ashore along a stretch of Florida’s west
coast, including Hillsborough County (NOAA 2010).
On August 4, the federal government also released a report detailing what was
deemed the “Oil Budget”. This report estimated the total discharge from the leak at 4.9
million barrels. In conjunction with this report, NOAA announced that only 50% of the
oil had been removed via evaporation, burning, skimming or direct recovery, and it was
unclear whether the remaining 50% still existed or was being degraded (Graham et al.
2011). The reports in early July and August injected detailed information from an
unbiased source into the uncertain risk environment that had been previously
characterized by speculation, damage minimization, and continual restatements of prior
information.2 For a more detailed description of events surrounding the DWH oil spill
see Table A.1 in Appendix A.

1

The Atlantic hurricane season lasts from June through November each year, which coincides with the
period of heightened risk of oil wash-ups due to the DWH in 2010. While NOAA classifies the 2010
Atlantic hurricane season as having “above normal” activity, Florida experienced no hurricanes during this
season. In fact, there were no hurricanes that impacted Florida between 2002-2014, except in 2004 and
2005 (Bakkensen, Ding and Ma 2018). Given no hurricanes in Florida occurred during our study period,
from 2006-2014, suggests that market responses to the hurricane season are unlikely to confound any
effects of risk regarding oil wash-ups in Hillsborough County.
2
The fact that BP twice failed at capping the well is often attributed to their underestimation of the
magnitude of the leak (Graham 2011). This provides further evidence of the uncertainty surrounding the
magnitude of the DWH disaster in the early summer.
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2.3. Empirical Approach
Our study first uses a hedonic framework and then analyzes sale volumes, both within a
difference-in-differences (DID) approach, to estimate costs associated with the risk of
damages presented by the DWH oil spill through coastal real estate markets. The
objective risk of oil wash-ups in Gulf states increased when the DWH explosion occurred
on April 20, 2010; however, this risk was the largest for states located closer to well site,
like Louisiana, which is located nearly 50 miles from the explosion site. Of all the Gulf
states, Florida is located furthest from the site of the DWH explosion. The first oil washups along Florida beaches began in June and extended only as far as Panama City, but no
wash-ups occurred beyond northwestern Florida in the months following the explosion
(Graham 2011). Despite the lack of wash-ups in other Florida counties, residents in these
counties received a continuous flow of information regarding the risk of wash-ups in the
months following the explosion. In this study, we explore how the provision of
information signaling objective risk impacted real estate prices and volumes through
changes in public risk perceptions. Since the aim of this paper is to measure the value of
losses associated with the risk of damages from the DWH oil spill, rather than actual
physical damages, we use sales data from Hillsborough County, a southwestern county in
Florida that did not ultimately have any oil wash-ups.
The value of nearby amenities, such as coastal proximity, is often capitalized into
home prices (Bin and Kruse 2006). As Hillsborough County is located on the Gulf coast,
coastal proximity is an important amenity, and we expect its value would be reduced by
oil wash-ups via health risks, diminished recreation and aesthetics. Therefore, we focus
on the potential degradation of the coastal amenity as the channel through which the risk
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of oil wash-ups would be capitalized and define coastal properties as our treated group
and non-coastal properties as our control group. We quantitatively determine our coastal
group based on the empirically diminishing amenity value of being located near the
waterfront. In a traditional DID, the treatment period is defined by the time after an
event; however, in our study, the event of interest is the discrete period over which
information regarding the risk of oil wash-up was pertinent to Gulf residents. Therefore,
we define the treatment period as the number of months (determined below) after the
DWH oil spill during which negative price effects persisted to some degree in the coastal
real estate market. We use a discrete – rather than open-ended – treatment period because
the relevant risk diminished after the spill had been sufficiently contained for several
months without any oil wash-ups.
Given the amenity value of the coast, we expect that coastal homes are
compositionally different from those located inland (see Table 2.1). Identification from a
sample of coastal and non-coastal residential property sales that occurred only during our
period of interest would therefore be confounded by the unobservable differences in the
groups. Inferences drawn from a sample which included only coastal residential property
sales could be confounded by shocks or trends that may exist independently of the event
of interest. Using the DID approach, we control for any trends or shocks that are common
in both the treated and control groups while also addressing compositional differences
between the groups. This panel-based approach, therefore, enables us to draw more
appropriate causal inferences about the effect of information regarding the DWH oil spill
on coastal residential sale prices and volumes than either a cross-sectional or event study.
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2.3.1 Data
Our hedonic model relies on data detailing structural, neighborhood and parcel
characteristics for homes sold in Hillsborough County, Florida. Hillsborough County is
located on the Gulf Coast in southwestern Florida. The closest county to Hillsborough
with oil wash-ups in 2010 was a distance of roughly 200 miles away as shown in Figure
2.1.
Figure 2.1: Hillsborough County and relative location of oiled counties in Florida.

Notes: The dark gray shaded area shows the location of Hillsborough County in the state of Florida while
the black shaded areas represent Florida counties that experienced oil wash-ups in 2010 as a result of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The closest county to Hillsborough with oil wash-ups in 2010 was a
Euclidean distance of roughly 200 miles away.
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These data were obtained from the Hillsborough County Property Appraiser and include
sales occurring between the years 1901-2015. Our examination focuses on observations
of sales of single-family residences that occurred in 2006 through 2014. Since the sale
prices of transactions that occur between non-independent parties (e.g. related to one
another) do not represent true market value, we keep only sales indicated as arms-length.
We also drop duplicate observations and outliers that could bias our results including
homes sized less than 500 square-feet, homes with lots sizes less than 0.01 acres, sales
below the 5th and above the 95th percentiles in price, and observations with missing
information for variables included in our analyses. The sample used in our main analysis
includes 112,312 transactions of 92,661 unique properties. All prices are standardized to
2014 dollars using the US Federal Housing Finance Agency’s (FHFA) quarterly price
indices for the Tampa-St. Petersburg metropolitan (FHFA 2017). Table 2.1 provides
summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis for our main sample and
separately for the treatment and control groups. Similarly, Table 2.2 provides summary
statistics of variables separately for our broadly defined treatment period compared with
the control period.

2.3.2 Identification of Treatment and Controls
We start by using regression analysis to define our treatment group. Since we are
interested in the effect of risk regarding the DWH oil spill on the coastal real estate
market, a natural control is the non-coastal real estate market. However, since the value
of the coast likely extends beyond simply waterfront properties, we seek to define a zone
in which proximity to the coast serves as a valuable amenity that is observably capitalized
into home values.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics for full sample, treatment Group (coastal zone) and control
group (non-coastal zone).
Variable
Full Sample
Coastal Zone
Non-Coastal Zone
Description
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Transaction 195,029 194,181
252,443 112,117
187,933 89,191
price in
2014$
Transaction 2010
3
2010
3
2010
3
year
Transaction 7
3
7
3
7
3
month
Age at time 21
21
32
27
20
20
of sale
Number of
2.24
0.65
2.15
0.67
2.26
0.64
bathrooms
Interior
living area
(sqft)

1,861

660

1,766

574

1,872

669

Parcel
acreage
=1 if pool
present, 0
otherwise
Dist. to
nearest
urban cluster
(km)
Dist. to
primary road
(km)
=1 if home
on
waterfront, 0
otherwise

0.26

0.47

0.17

0.20

0.27

0.49

0.21

0.41

0.17

0.37

0.22

0.41

18.57

9.61

14.93

8.09

19.02

9.69

4.92

3.80

4.92

2.33

4.92

3.94

0.03

0.18

0.10

0.30

0.02

0.15

Dist. to the
coast (m)

10,134

7,263

1,047

521

11,275

6,912

Observations 112,312

12,354

99,958

Notes: The full sample includes arms-length transactions of single-family residences in Hillsborough
County from 2006 through 2014 for which information on all variables included in the analyses is
available. This sample also removes duplicate observations, homes sized less than 500 square-feet,
homes with lots sizes less than 0.01 acres, and sales below the 5th and above the 95th percentiles in price.
Sale prices are in 2014 constant dollars. The treatment group (coastal zone) is defined as sales of
residential properties located within 2,000 meters from the coast and control group (non-coastal zone)
includes the remaining inland sales.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics for full sample, broadly-defined treated period (July
through December 2010) and control period.
Variable
Full Sample
July-Dec 2010
Non-Treated
Description
Period
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Transaction 195,029 194,181
207,908 103,134
194,505 93,761
price in
2014$
Transaction 2010
3
2010
0
2010
3
year
Transaction 7
3
10
2
6
3
month
Age at time 21
21
19
20
21
22
of sale
Number of
2.24
0.65
2.30
0.64
2.24
0.65
bathrooms
Interior
living area
(sqft)

1,861

660

1,928

664

1,858

660

Parcel
acreage
=1 if pool
present, 0
otherwise
Dist. to
nearest
urban cluster
(km)
Dist. to
primary road
(km)
=1 if home
on
waterfront, 0
otherwise

0.26

0.47

0.26

0.40

0.26

0.47

0.21

0.41

0.23

0.42

0.21

0.41

18.57

9.61

19.36

9.71

18.54

9.60

4.92

3.80

5.05

3.85

4.91

3.79

0.03

0.18

0.03

0.18

0.03

0.18

Dist. to the
coast (m)

10,134

7,263

10,470

7,393

10,120

7,257

Observations 112,312

4,390

107,922

Notes: The full sample includes arms-length transactions of single-family residences in Hillsborough
County from 2006 through 2014 for which information on all variables included in the analyses is
available. This sample also removes duplicate observations, homes sized less than 500 square-feet,
homes with lots sizes less than 0.01 acres, and sales below the 5th and above the 95th percentiles in price.
Sale prices are in 2014 constant dollars. The treatment period is defined as sales of residential properties
occurring from July through December 2010 and the control period includes the remaining sales.
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To this end, we regress the natural log of home prices on various structural and
neighborhood characteristics and allow prices to vary flexibly with distance from the
coast. We specify the following model:

f f
ln ]?^@ = _`ab c + ∑Mg
fhM(e .? ) + ib j + k^ + S?^@

(2.1)

In Equation (2.1) ln ]?^@ is the natural log of transaction price for home i located in
neighborhood j at time t. xijt is a vector of home, parcel and neighborhood
characteristics, while ib includes year and month-of-year fixed effects and k^ is a
neighborhood fixed effect at the Census tract group level. The variable .?f includes
dummies representing ten bands of distance from the coast, where d=1 corresponds to
homes located 0 to 500 meters from coast, d=2 indicates homes located 500 meters to
1,000 meters from the coast, and so on until d=10, which indicates homes located 4,500
meters to 5000 meters from the coast. εijt is a random disturbance term assumed to be
distributed normally with a zero mean.
The results of this regression are presented in Table 2.3 The coefficients on the
coastal band dummies are positive and highly statistically significant up to 2,000 meters
from the coast and lose significance thereafter. This pattern suggests the price premium
associated with the coastal amenity disappears after 2,000 meters (about 1 mile) from the
coast. This result is further supplemented by Figure 2.2, which shows the residuals from
a regression of the natural log of detrended prices on observables against the distance
from the coast. Figure 2.2 clearly demonstrates that residual prices begin to climb in
relation to coastal proximity beginning around 2,000 meters from the coast.
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Table 2.3: Regression results for identification of treatment group.
Impact on ln(Price)
Located 0-500 meters from the coast
0.3309***
(0.0638)
Located 500-1,000 meters from the coast
0.2546***
(0.0558)
Located 1,000-1,500 meters from the coast
0.1877***
(0.0574)
Located 1,500-2,000 meters from the coast
0.1213**
(0.0484)
Located 2,000-2,500 meters from the coast
0.0132
(0.0455)
Located 2,500-3,000 meters from the coast
0.0205
(0.0429)
Located 3,000-3,500 meters from the coast
0.0012
(0.0398)
Located 3,500-4,000 meters from the coast
-0.0052
(0.0347)
Located 4,000-4,500 meters from the coast
-0.0297
(0.0331)
Located 4,500-5,000 meters from the coast
-0.0074
(0.0270)
Census Tract Fixed Effects

Y

Year Fixed Effects

Y

Month-of-Year Fixed Effects

Y

Observations

112,312

Adj. R2
0.7842
*** - significant at 0.01; **- significant at 0.05; *- significant at 0.10
Robust Standard Errors are Clustered by Census Tract in Parenthesis ( )
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of sale prices in 2014 dollars. Additional
controls include the age of the home at the time of sale, a quadratic term for age of sale, the
total number of bathrooms, the natural log of interior square footage, the natural log of the
parcel size, an indicator for the presence of a pool, the distance to the nearest urban cluster in
kilometers, the distance to the nearest primary road in kilometers, an indicator for location on
the waterfront, and Census tract, year and month-of-year fixed effects.
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Figure 2.2: Distance decay of premium for coastal amenity in Hillsborough County.

Notes: The natural log of sale prices in 2014 dollars is regressed on the age of the home at the time of sale,
a quadratic term for age of sale, the total number of bathrooms, the natural log of interior square footage,
the natural log of the parcel size, an indicator for the presence of a pool, the distance to the nearest urban
cluster in kilometers, the distance to the nearest primary road in kilometers, an indicator for location on the
waterfront, and Census tract, year and month-of-year fixed effects. The plot displays a local polynomial
regression of the residuals against the home’s distance from the coast in meters with smoothing at degree 1
and a bandwidth of 750.

These results suggest that the amenity value of the coast is not restricted to waterfront
properties (though the estimates do suggest nearly an 18% price premium for waterfront
properties, and therefore, we do control for being located on the waterfront in other
analyses). Therefore, we define our treatment group, coastal zone homes, as those located
up to 2,000 meters from the coast and our control as the homes located beyond 2,000
meters in Hillsborough County.

46

Using this definition of the coastal zone, we first confirm the existence of some
response to information regarding the DWH oil spill on home prices in Hillsborough
County and then seek to identify a treatment period over which the effects of oil wash-up
risks led to reduced real estate values. Expanding on the approach to identifying a coastal
zone and again controlling for seasonality, time trends, and property and neighborhood
characteristics, we regress an interaction of 12 monthly dummies over the period from
February 2010 to January 2011 with an indicator for whether the home is coastal or noncoastal. To identify the timing and types of information that may have been important for
the capitalization of risk into market prices, we estimate the following DID model:

l

l

l

l
ln ]?^@ = _`ab c + e.? + ∑MR
lhM(V *@ + m n.? ∗ *@ p) + ib j + k^ + S?^@

(2.2)

Equation (2.2) is similar to Equation (2.1) but includes only one coastal dummy, .? , and
l

adds the variable, *? , and the interaction of these two terms. .? equals one if the home
l

is located within the coastal zone, and *? are indicators for each of the twelve months
from February 2010 through January 2011, where p=1 corresponds to homes that sold
anytime during the month of February 2010, p=2 indicates homes that sold anytime
during the month of March 2010, and so on until p=12, which indicates a transaction
anytime during the month of January 2011. The time period considered by this analysis
was selected to provide time before and after the leak was active so that the full temporal
extent of the effects can be characterized. The interaction terms allow us to identify
impacts in the months following the spill in order to define broader treatment periods.
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The coefficients of interest, the interaction of coastal zone sales with each
monthly indicator, are plotted in Figure 2.3 (Table A.2 in Appendix A presents the values
of the interaction terms).

Figure 2.3: Price effects by month.

Notes: The natural log of sale prices in 2014 dollars is regressed on the age of the home at the time of sale,
a quadratic term for age of sale, the total number of bathrooms, the natural log of interior square footage,
the natural log of the parcel size, an indicator for the presence of a pool, the distance to the nearest urban
cluster in kilometers, the distance to the nearest primary road in kilometers, an indicator for location on the
waterfront, an indicator for coastal zone, monthly indicators for each month shown above, the interaction of
the coastal zone and monthly indicators (plotted above) and Census tract, year and month-of-year fixed
effects. The coastal zone is defined as sales of residential properties located within 2,000 meters from the
coast and non-coastal zone includes the remaining inland sales. The plot displays the coefficients and 90%
confidence intervals associated with the interaction of monthly dummies with the coastal zone indicator
from this regression.

The only coefficients that are statistically significant at conventional levels are the
months of August and September 2010; however, the negative signs on coefficients in the
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months of July through December are suggestive of a broader treatment period. We
conclude from this analysis that coastal zone homes sold for less in August and
September 2010 due to the DWH oil spill but may have sold for less from July through
December 2010 and run two specifications: one defining the treatment period as August
through September 2010 and a second that defines the treatment period as July through
December 2010. The first seeks to capture the acute effect of information highlighting an
environmental risk while the second specification captures the entire effect of uncertainty
regarding the local effects of the DWH disaster.
With our treatment and control groups and periods defined, we assess the validity
of our control by graphing the price paths for the coastal and non-coastal groups during
the period of our study between 2006 and 2014. Figure 2.4 shows that while the trends
outside our defined treatment period are not perfectly matched, they generally follow
similar trends, especially leading into the treatment period when divergence in trends is
most likely to undermine the parallel-trends assumption at the heart of DID identification.
Our main treatment effect is also clearly visible in Figure 2.4 as coastal zone prices begin
to slope downward in the treatment period, while non-coastal zone prices remain upward
sloping.
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Figure 2.4: Sale price paths for coastal zone and non-coastal zone residential properties
from 2006 through 2014 in Hillsborough County.

Notes: The natural log of sale prices in 2014 dollars is regressed on an indicator for coastal zone
properties. The treated group (coastal zone) is defined as sales of residential properties located within
2,000 meters from the coast and control (non-coastal zone) includes the remaining inland sales. The plot
displays a cubic spline function with 15 bands specified. The broad treatment period, from July through
December 2010, is contained by the two vertical lines. The periods before July 2010 and after December
2010 represent the untreated time period.

2.3.3 Main Specification
Using our identified treatment group and periods, we specify the following DID
model to estimate the impact of information associated with the DWH oil spill on coastal
properties in Hillsborough County:

ln ]?^@ = _`ab c + e.? + qrkr,s@ + m{rkr,s@ × .? } + ib j + k^ + S?^@
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(2.3)

Equation (2.3), the specification for our main results, is identical to Equation (2.2) except
instead of the series of monthly indicators, we include the single indicator variable,
rkr,s@ which is equal to one if the transaction took place during our identified treatment
period. The coefficient of interest attached to the interaction between the treatment group
and period, m, represents the average treatment effect on the treated group. As the
dependent variable in Equation (2.3) is logged, coefficient estimates are interpreted as the
percent change in housing prices associated with the treatment effect.
In addition to the analysis of sales prices described above, we also estimate the
impact of the spill on weekly sales volumes, as homeowners may have been less likely to
negotiate coastal property sales until the uncertainty resolved. This represents another
channel, alongside price impacts, through which the spill could have welfare impacts.
Even in the absence of price effects, reduced sales volumes could still indicate costly
impacts of increased levels of perceived risk. This may be the case if homeowners were
unable to sell their homes at the optimal time due to lack of interested buyers or if
prospective buyers were unable to purchase a home due to low availability of homes on
the market. To investigate whether and to what extent the DWH may have impacted
sales volumes in Hillsborough County, we regress the number of weekly sales by Census
tract on a dummy indicator for location in our defined coastal zone, a dummy for our
identified time period, the interaction between our treated group and time period, and
month-of-year and year fixed effects. We define the coastal zone as those tracts that
include at least 85% of properties within 2,000 meters of the coast.
Since the dependent variable is the number of weekly sales by Census tract,
observations are counts, or nonnegative integer values. In the case of count data, the
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Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator is not appropriate as it generates both positive
and negative predicted values. Additionally, natural log transformations have limited use
when the dependent variable contains many zero observations as is the case in our
dependent variable. Therefore, we analyze sale volumes using the Poisson and negative
binomial count data models (Wooldridge 2002). We begin by using the maximum
likelihood estimator to estimate the Poisson model given by:

{

r Lz(_)z(_)
w(x|_) =
,
x!

x = 0,1, …

(2.4)

In Equation (2.4), y is the number of weekly sales by Census tract, and x is a vector of
independent variables including an indicator for the coastal group, an indicator for the
treated time period, an interaction term for the coastal group and treated time period, and
month-of-year and year fixed effects. Y ( ) ≡ Å (x|_) = r _Ç is the conditional mean,
which is assumed equal to the conditional variance, Var(y|x).
When the variance-mean equality assumption is violated, the data display
overdispersion, which is accounted for in a generalization of the Poisson model, the
negative binomial model (Cameron and Trivedi 1986). Using the maximum likelihood
estimator, we also estimate this model below:

w(x|_) =

1
Γ Jx + P K

1
Γ(x + 1)Γ JP K

(PY(_))Ñ [1 + PY(_)]L(ÑáM⁄à ) ,

52

x = 0,1, …

(2.5)

The variables in Equation (2.5) are the same as previously defined in Equation (2.4) with
the addition of the nuisance parameter to be estimated, P > 0. The conditional mean is
Y ( ) ≡ Å (x|_) = r _Ç , and the conditional variance is >ãå(x|_) = Y(1 + PY), such that
the variance is greater than the mean.

2.4 Results and Discussion
Table 2.4 presents the coefficients of interest from our main specification for
analyzing price impacts in Equation (2.3). Each column in Table 2.4 represents a
separate regression. The second column reports the coefficient on the interaction term
when the treatment period is defined as August through September 2010, and the third
column reports the coefficient on the interaction term when the treatment period is
defined as July through December 2010. In both regressions, this coefficient is negative
and statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
These results suggest that the net impact of information regarding the risk of oil
wash-ups on coastal zone homes was nearly a 4% reduction in sale prices between two
and eight months after the DWH oil spill, with the largest impact of 7% reduction in
prices occurring in August and September 2010. We also note that the signs on the
coefficients associated with the control variables in both regressions are consistent with
expectations.
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Table 2.4: Main results: Price impacts associated with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill
during periods when perceived risk was capitalized into home values.
Coastal zone sale
August
through September
Coastal zone sale July
2010
through December 2010
Impact on ln (Price)
-0.0672***
-0.0382***
(0.0228)
(0.0141)
Tract Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Month-of-Year
Effects
Observations

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

112,312

112,312

Fixed

Adj. R2
0.7830
0.7830
*** - significant at 0.01; **- significant at 0.05; *-significant at 0.10
Robust Standard Errors are Clustered by Census Tract in Parenthesis ( )
Notes: The columns represent two separate regressions with different definitions of the treated period. In
both regressions, the dependent variable is the natural log of sale prices in 2014 dollars, and additional
controls include the age of the home at the time of sale, a quadratic term for age of sale, the total number of
bathrooms, the natural log of interior square footage, the natural log of the parcel size, an indicator for the
presence of a pool, the distance to the nearest urban cluster in kilometers, the distance to the nearest
primary road in kilometers, an indicator for location on the waterfront, an indicator for the treated period,
an indicator for coastal zone, and Census tract, year and month-of-year fixed effects. The treated group
(coastal zone) is defined as sales of residential properties located within 2,000 meters from the coast and
control (non-coastal zone) includes the remaining inland sales.

Because the observed date in the sales data is the date of closing and not the
beginning of the sale contract, we expect some lag in price responses. Since the average
time between the beginning of a contract and closing of a sale is four to six weeks, the
price impacts in July through December 2010 can most reasonably be attributed to events
that occurred in late May through early November (Zillow 2017). Though oil begin
washing up in Louisiana as soon as one week after the DWH explosion, it was not until
May 19 that oil had entered the Loop Current in the Gulf, and it was announced that oil
could move towards Florida (BBC 2010). Shortly after, in the beginning of June, oil
began to wash-up along the coast of the Florida Panhandle, and health advisories were
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issued for some beaches in Escambia County at the end of June (Florida SERT 2017).
According to the results from the broader treatment period definition, the public
perception of this local risk was not enough to be capitalized into the Hillsborough
County real estate market until oil wash-ups actually occurred in Florida, suggesting the
relevance of risk-signaling information is an important dimension for capitalization of
risk into home prices.
In addition to relevance, authoritative sources of risk information also appear to
drive market impacts in our study, which is demonstrated by the largest and most
significant price impacts occurring in August and September 2010. Accounting for time
between the contract date and closing date, this price effect aligns with information
released in early July through August, which corresponds to the release of the two major
government reports that quantified wash-up risks. In the July report an official source
explicitly assigned a non-zero risk of oil wash-ups to Hillsborough County. The August
report provided a specific value for the amount of oil that had been released, which was
much larger than prior estimates, and also provided estimates of the volume of extant oil
extant in Gulf that still threatened shorelines. Both reports came from an authoritative
source, which suggests that trust may play an influential role in shaping perceived risks
consistent with Botzen, Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan’s (2015) findings on flood-related
risk perceptions. While the first report included information directly relevant to
Hillsborough County, information contained in the second report likely increased the
mean subjective risk level of oil wash-ups in all coastal areas considered to have non-zero
risk. Throughout May and June, information regarding the amount of oil leaking and its
movement in the Gulf was continually updated and presented casually across the media
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but did not result in impacts in the Hillsborough County real estate market. In contrast,
the authoritative presentation of information contained in the July and August reports
corresponds to the significant reductions in coastal home values in Hillsborough County
in August and September.
Over a broader period, sale price reductions follow the first oil wash-ups in
Florida and diminish only after the permanent containment of the leak and the remaining
volumes of spilled oil were likely not perceived to pose significant wash-up risk. As
presented in Figure 2.3, our results suggest price effects from July through December
with significant drops in magnitude following the definitive shut down of the oil well in
mid-September. These price responses are in accordance with the real estate market
responding to perceived risk of oil wash-ups given that the effects follow the earliest oil
wash-ups in Florida, strongly persist throughout the months when an authoritative source
released information demonstrating clear risk and dissipate shortly after the shutting
down of the well.
In a demonstration of the validity of our identification strategy, we conduct a
placebo test in which the treatment periods are coded to be one year before or one year
after the time of the actual treatment periods considered in our analysis. As presented in
Table 2.5, none of the estimated price effects are significant during the placebo periods,
suggesting our estimation strategy effectively identifies non-cyclical variation unique to
the coastal properties during the period when risk of oil wash-ups from the DWH leak
was the greatest.
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Table 2.5: Placebo test: Price impacts in the year of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill
compared to the years before and after.
Coastal zone sale August
Coastal zone sale July
through September
through December
Treated year = 2009
-0.0248
0.0090
(0.0215)
(0.0172)
Treated year = 2010
-0.0672***
-0.0382***
(0.0228)
(0.0141)
Treated year = 2011
-0.0220
0.0066
(0.0171)
(0.0155)
*** - significant at 0.01; **- significant at 0.05; *-significant at 0.10
Robust Standard Errors are Clustered by Census Tract in Parenthesis ( )
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression. The columns represent different definitions of the treated
period while the rows indicate a different treated year. Our main results use treated periods in 2010. In all
regressions, the dependent variable is the natural log of sale prices in 2014 dollars, and additional controls
include the age of the home at the time of sale, a quadratic term for age of sale, the total number of
bathrooms, the natural log of interior square footage, the natural log of the parcel size, an indicator for the
presence of a pool, the distance to the nearest urban cluster in kilometers, the distance to the nearest
primary road in kilometers, an indicator for location on the waterfront, and indicator for the treated period,
an indicator for coastal zone, and Census tract, year and month-of-year fixed effects. The treated group
(coastal zone) is defined as sales of residential properties located within 2,000 meters from the coast and
control (non-coastal zone) includes the remaining inland sales.

In Table 2.6, we also demonstrate that our effects are robust to changes in the definition
of our main sample, specifically the inclusion of all sales, irrespective of selling price,
and the inclusion a wider set of residential properties (single-family, townhomes, condos
and mobile homes).
Finally, in Table 2.7 we present the results from our sales volume analysis. Table
2.7 reports the marginal effects for the Poisson and negative binomial models, which give
the discrete change in weekly sale counts by Census tract between non-coastal zone and
coastal zone sales evaluated at the mean number of sales. Though the estimated
coefficients on the interaction between the coastal zone and defined time periods are
statistically insignificant and of similar magnitude in both models, the nuisance
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Table 2.6: Robustness check: Price impacts using differently defined samples of sale
prices.
Coastal zone sale
Coastal zone sale
August through
July through
September 2010
December 2010
-0.0672***
-0.0382***
Main Sample
(0.0228)
(0.0141)
Single-family residences, all
-0.0589***
-0.0330**
prices
(0.0223)
(0.0157)
All residence types, price
-0.0600***
-0.0268*
restrictions
(0.02188)
(0.0162)
*** - significant at 0.01; **- significant at 0.05; *-significant at 0.10
Robust Standard Errors are Clustered by Census Tract in Parenthesis ( )
Notes: The rows represent regressions using different samples while columns represent regressions with
different definitions of the treated period for each sample. The first row represents the main sample which
includes only sales of single-family residences and those within the 5th and 95th percentiles in price
(n=112,312). The second row’s sample includes only sales of single-family residences but does not
exclude any sales based on price (n=124,827). The third row excludes sales below the 5th and above the
95th percentiles in price but includes all residence types, single-family, townhomes, condos, and mobile
homes (n=153,972). In all regressions, the dependent variable is the natural log of sale prices in 2014
dollars, and additional controls include the age of the home at the time of sale, a quadratic term for age of
sale, the total number of bathrooms, the natural log of interior square footage, the natural log of the parcel
size, an indicator for the presence of a pool, the distance to the nearest urban cluster in kilometers, the
distance to the nearest primary road in kilometers, an indicator for location on the waterfront, an indicator
for the treated period, an indicator for coastal zone, and Census tract, year and month-of-year fixed effects.
The treated group (coastal zone) is defined as sales of residential properties located within 2,000 meters
from the coast and control (non-coastal zone) includes the remaining inland sales.

parameter, P, from Equation (2.5) is statistically significant, indicating overdispersion
and lending support for the negative binomial model over the Poisson. These results
suggest that oil wash-up risk impacted sale prices in Hillsborough County, but not
average sales volumes. Together with the lack of clear evidence for compositional shifts
in the properties transacted during the treated period (see Table 2.2), these results suggest
that reduced transaction prices were the main market response to the increased levels of
perceived risk during the period following the DWH explosion.
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Table 2.7: Impacts on weekly sale volumes by census tract (marginal effects).
Coastal zone sale
August through
Coastal zone sale July
September 2010
through December 2010
Poisson
-0.0438
0.0130
(0.0614)
(0.0443)
Negative Binomial
-0.0504
0.0049
(0.0611)
(0.0442)
Year Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Month-of-Year Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Observations
143,208
143,208
*** - significant at 0.01; **- significant at 0.05; *-significant at 0.10
Robust Standard Errors are Clustered by Census Tract in Parenthesis ( )
Notes: : Each cell displays the marginal effect at the mean associated with the interaction between the
coastal zone and treated period for a different regression. The marginal effect is the expected difference in
the number of weekly sales within a Census tract between coastal and inland property sales. The columns
represent different definitions of the treated period while the rows use a different estimation method:
Poisson, and negative binomial. The dependent variable is the number of weekly sales by Census tract, and
additional controls include an indicator for coastal zone, an indicator for treated time period and year and
month-of-year fixed effects. A Census tract is defined as being in the treated group (coastal zone) if it
contains at least 85% of properties located within 2,000 meters of the coast.

2.5 Conclusion
While many losses attributable to environmental disasters are evident through the
destruction of property or loss of life, the risk of such damage imposes less obvious
economic losses through social perceptions. This paper seeks to causally identify the
losses imposed by the perceived risk of oil wash-up from the DWH oil spill on coastal
real-estate markets and the types of information that drive these losses and therefore are
important for informing perceived risk levels. We investigate damages resulting from
informational signals of risk regarding the DWH oil spill to homeowners in Hillsborough
County, Florida. While oil wash-ups occurred along much of the Gulf Coast shoreline,
no oil reached the beaches in Hillsborough County; yet our results suggest that coastal
sale prices were nonetheless reduced due to the oil spill. Using a difference-in-differences
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specification within a hedonic framework, we find suggestive evidence of price impacts
between July and December 2010, with the largest effects observed for sales that closed
in August and September. These impacts correspond to the information types that
contain relevant and authoritatively sourced assessments of risk to Hillsborough County,
suggesting the importance of these dimensions of information in shaping public
perceptions of risk.
A back-of-the-envelope calculation based on our findings of a 4% decline in
prices multiplied by the average sale price for coastal residences in the untreated period
($252,181) and the number of coastal homes sold between July and December 2010 (447)
results in nearly $4.5 million worth of real estate losses in Hillsborough County due to
the perceived risks associated with the DWH oil spill. Putting this figure in perspective,
as part of a lawsuit filed by the US Department of Justice, Florida was awarded $3.25
billion to cover damages incurred as a result of the DWH oil spill, of which $28.5 million
was allocated to Hillsborough County to compensate losses mainly in tourism revenues
(Contorno 2015). According to this figure, of the $28.5 million paid to Hillsborough
County, nearly 16% of this is accounts for losses experienced by sellers of coastal real
estate in the county during the second half of 2010. These demonstrated losses suggest
that policymakers must consider a more comprehensive definition of damages,
specifically accounting for losses associated with public perception of risks, when
compensating state and local governments for losses due to environmental disasters.
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CHAPTER 3
IDENTIFYING THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF INFORMATION ON POLLUTION
LEVELS IN CHILE
with Jamie Mullins, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst, MA
3.1. Introduction
Air pollution is still a significant problem in many parts of the world. While it
can be difficult to effectively regulate sources of pollution emissions, developing
countries in particular are burdened by the tradeoff between economic growth and air
quality concerns. Chile, however, is one country that appears to have achieved a balance.
Over the past two decades, Chile has significantly reduced air pollution concentrations in
its most populous and economically important city, Santiago. It has also recently joined
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2010,
signifying its shift in status from a developing to developed nation. Chile has come a
long way in the last three decades. Santiago, in particular was long known for its
extremely poor air quality. As a result, the government of Chile began a concerted effort
to address air pollution in the late 1980s through late 1990s, eventually implementing the
Plan de Prevención y Descontaminación Atmosférica (translated as the Plan to Prevent
and Reduce Air Pollution (PPDA)) in the Santiago Metropolitan Region in 1997.
The PPDA includes multiple provisions aimed at reducing air pollution, but
central to this policy is the monitoring and announcement of days for which air pollution
concentrations are projected to exceed threshold levels. Days expected to have
particularly poor air quality are deemed “Episodes”. The day prior to an Episode, the
public is notified, and on the day of an Episode, a number of restrictions on various
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emissions activities go in effect. The PPDA has been an important policy intervention
for Santiago. Before going into effect, it was not uncommon for levels of particulate
matter (PM10) in Santiago to exceed the World Health Organization (WHO)’s 24-hour
mean guideline for PM10 by 500% or more (WHO 2011).1
Troncoso, de Grange and Cifuentes (2012) and Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014)
both find that Episode announcements (as part of the PPDA) effectively reduce air
pollution levels in the short-run. Troncoso, de Grange and Cifuentes (2012) study
suggests that Episodes lead to significant reductions in particulate matter, CO, NOx, and
O3 during an Episode. Focusing specifically on PM10, Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014)
demonstrate that Episodes work on two crucial dimensions: Episodes reduce both PM10
concentrations and mortality on the day of and in the days following an announcement.
That improvements in air quality and mortality occur simultaneously is consistent with
studies that establish a link between short-term exposure to high levels of air pollution
and a broad range of negative human health outcomes (Currie et al. 2009; Neidell 2009;
Graff Zivin and Neidell 2012; Schlenker and Walker 2016).
Aside from the impact of exposure on health, however, short-term spikes in
pollution may also be costly if individuals undertake behavioral changes to avoid such
exposure (Graff Zivin and Neidell 2013). A number of studies demonstrate that
individuals change their behavior in response to publicly disclosed information regarding
environmental conditions to avoid or reduce exposure (Shimshack, Ward and Beatty
2007; Graff Zivin, Neidell and Schlenker 2011). For instance, Neidell (2009) finds that
attendance at outdoor facilities falls in Southern California as a result of “smog alerts”.

1

The WHO guideline for daily mean PM10 is 50 µg/m3.
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Similarly, Cutter and Neidell (2009) show that public advisories on high ozone levels in
the San Francisco Bay area reduce traffic volumes and increase use of public
transportation. These papers highlight the importance of the role of information and
suggest that information can play in integral role in policy design and implementation.
And while there are several studies that assess the effectiveness of short-term policy
measures set by local governments to limit pollution exposure, few disentangle the health
and information channels of the effects they identify by controlling for avoidance
behavior (Neidell 2009; Moretti and Neidell 2011).
Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014) find significant reductions in mortality as a result
of the Chilean Episode announcements; however, these identified health effects represent
both the biological effect associated with reduced PM10 concentrations and any
behavioral effects that reduce individuals’ exposure to PM10 by avoiding outdoor
activities and/or reducing exposure via other costly means (e.g. the employment of
filtration systems). Considering the effectiveness of Episodes, it is important to
understand the mechanisms through which Episodes appear to reduce mortality rates in
the Santiago Metropolitan Region. Since Episodes both reduce PM10 levels and involve
information dissemination, mortality reductions could be a result of biological responses
to ambient pollution concentrations, behavioral changes, or both. To provide insight on
the channels through which Episodes improve health outcomes, in this paper we
decompose the total effect of Episodes given by Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014) to isolate
any behavioral effect of information from the biological effect of reduced PM10.
To do this, we decompose Mullins and Bharadwaj’s (2014) results through the
use of an alternative control group which allows for the separate identification of the
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purely information-driven mortality reducing effects of Episode announcements. Mullins
and Bharadwaj (2014) identify the mortality effects of Episodes by matching days on
which Episode announcements occur with similar days based on conditions preceding the
matched day. Pollution and mortality outcomes are then compared following the Episode
and matched days (when no Episode was announced) to identify the effects of the
Episode announcement. We similarly use propensity score matching and a difference-indifference approach to first replicate Mullins and Bharadwaj’s (2014) results, estimating
the full impact of Episode announcements on mortality. To estimate the behavioral
effects of Episodes, we then use propensity score matching based on conditions both
before and after Episode announcements to match periods with similar pollution patterns
in which no Episode was announced. In both cases, matches are drawn from the period
before the full implementation of the PPDA when Episodes where not yet in full use.
Because the pollution conditions are by construction similar between Episode periods and
matched periods, differences in health outcomes following an Episode (versus matched
non-Episode periods) can be attributed directly to the informational content of the
Episode announcement and the resulting avoidance behaviors undertaken by the
population in response to the provided information.
We find that, holding PM10 constant, Episode announcements result in a
significant reduction in deaths, particularly for respiratory deaths among the general
population and the elderly. Our results are consistent with other studies finding that
individuals do limit their exposure to air pollution after the provision of information on
air quality. These results also provide evidence that information is an essential
component of the PPDA in affecting health outcomes. In addition, the estimated impacts
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of the Episodes’ informational effects have magnitudes comparable to the estimated total
effects of Episode announcements on the day of and two days after an Episode
announcement, suggesting that information is playing a critical role in the reduction of
mortality following Episode announcements. Our results suggest that little of the
observed reduction in mortality following Episodes is attributable to lower ambient air
pollution in the most immediate days following an announcement, despite the fact that air
pollution does improve significantly following Episode announcements.
Our findings extend those of Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014) by providing new and
integral information in the assessment of the overall effectiveness of the PPDA Episodes.
To understand the short-term effectiveness of PPDA Episodes requires the
disentanglement of the concentration-reducing and information-provision channels of
impact. As air quality improvement and avoidance behaviors impose different costs on
the economy and society, the correct attribution of the benefits of the Episodes is critical
for the future management of the negative effects of air quality in Santiago. Additionally,
our results are important for informing the implementation of short-term approaches for
addressing spikes in air pollution in other major urban centers. Given the growing
prevalence of extreme air pollution events in metro areas from Europe to Latin America
and Asia, such a focused understanding of the Chilean success story is more important
than ever.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides background on
pollution in Santiago and the institutional setting. Section 3 describes our data and
empirical approach, and Section 4 presents a discussion of our main results. In Section 5
we conclude the paper.
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3.2. Background
Santiago, Chile has historically suffered from poor air quality being particularly
prone to pollution due to its geographic location at the base of the Andes mountain range.
In this location Santiago frequently experiences temperature inversion layers, which
reduce vertical atmospheric mixing and keep pollutant emissions on the ground (Prendez,
Alvarado and Serey 2011). Air pollution is of particular concern in the winter months
(April-August) when the inversion layers lay closer the ground, trapping and
concentrating pollutants (Rutllant and Garreaud 1995; Gramsch et al. 2006).
While the government of Chile constructed and began to implement policies that
identified and announced pollution Episodes to address growing concerns of pollution in
the early 1990s, the PPDA was officially published in 1997 after which the policy was
strictly enforced. The policy designed a tiered labeling system for the announced
Episodes. Episodes encompass three event labels, “Alerts”, “Pre-Emergencies” and
“Emergencies”, announced separately and distinguished to signal increasing levels of
pollution threshold exceedance. The Alert, Pre-Emergency and Emergency Episodes
were designed to be announced if daily PM10 concentrations are predicted to exceed 195
µg/m3, 240 µg/m3 and 320 µg/m3, respectively. On the day of an Episode, the
government imposes several restrictions to reduce pollution levels, and the specific
restrictions vary in intensity by level of Episode. See Table B.1 in the Appendix B for a
detailed account of the restrictions associated with each Episode level.
Prior to the establishment of the PPDA in 1997, Episodes announcements were
generally inconsistent compared to the period after 1997. Between 1989 and 1997, PM10
levels exceeded 240 µg/m3 on 148 days; however less than 60 of these days were

67

announced as Episodes. Comparatively, nearly 100% of days deemed Episodes between
1997 and 2008 were announced (see Figure 3.1). Since Episode announcements prior to
the implementation of the PPDA were generally ineffective, we find days in the postPPDA period when Episodes were announced that are similar to days in the pre-PPDA
period when Episodes should have been announced but were not and exploit this
difference to identify the effect of an announcement on PM10 and mortality outcomes.

Figure 3.1: Episode occurrences and announcements before and after PPDA Episode
implementation (Mullins and Bharadwaj 2014).

3.3 Data and Methodology
3.3.1 Data Description
To identify the behavioral effect of episode announcements, we combine
observations on PM10 concentrations, weather, Episode announcements and mortality at
the daily level from 1989 to 2008. The PM10 concentration data are from Chile’s
Ministry of the Environment, which maintains data collected by the MACAM 1 and
MACAM 2 monitor networks on PM10 concentrations prior to 1997 and after1997,
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respectively. The MACAM 2 network currently includes nine monitors spread across
Santiago, specifically located to observe concentrations at both hotspot and typical
pollution levels (Gramsch et al. 2006). As only three sites were monitored consistently
across our period of study, we use PM10 data from only the sites, Parque O'Higgins, La
Paz (or Independencia) and Las Condes, and average the daily mean PM10 concentration
across these stations. 2
Since weather conditions are likely to be correlated with pollution levels and
mortality, we include various weather controls in our analysis. We obtain hourly weather
data from the Summary of the Day data series from the U.S. National Climatic Data
Center (NCDC) and use daily mean wind, precipitation and temperature observations as
controls. We also combine information on Episode announcements with the PM10 and
weather data. The Santiago Metropolitan Region’s Ministry of Health provides the dates
of each episode and corresponding pollution levels.
Finally, we use aggregate daily mortality data and merge it with the PM10
concentration, weather and Episode data. The mortality data are from the Chilean
Ministry of Health’s Department of Statistics and Health information. Data on death
counts are available starting in 1992 while data on cause-of-death begins in 1994. The
cause-of-death data include information on date of death, age at death, and International
Classification of Diseases (ICD) codes for primary and secondary causes of death. Table
3.1 details the means of variables used in our analysis for the pre-PPDA and post-PPDA
periods.

2

Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014) demonstrate that the effects of Episodes on PM10 levels and mortality are
generally robust to the inclusion of all monitors in their analysis.
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Table 3.1: Comparison of means before and after PPDA Episode implementation for
variables used in analysis.

Daily Mean PM10 (µg/m3)
Daily Temperature (℉)
Daily Wind Speed (knots)
Daily Precipitation (inches)
Daily Deaths
Daily Deaths Over 64
Daily Respiratory Deaths
Daily Respiratory Deaths Over 64
Daily Circulatory Deaths
Daily Circulatory Deaths Over 64
Daily Cancer Deaths
Daily Cancer Deaths Over 64
Daily Accidental Deaths
Daily Accidental Deaths Over 64
Avg. Population
Avg. Population Over 64
Avg. # Emergency Episodes per Year
Avg. # Pre-Emergency Episodes per
Year

Potential Matched Days
1989-1996
106.15
57.85
4.72
0.03
77.15
47.7
10.2
7.9
21.76
17.23
17.21
10.72
7.98
1.45
5,496,505
343,922
0.75

Potential Treated Days
1997-2008
69.28
58.41
4.8
0.03
85.79
57.45
9.22
7.76
23.92
19.12
20.17
13.22
5.63
1.19
6,342,665
469,945
0.17

6.63

7.42

3.3.2 Methodology
While Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014) suggest that the PPDA Episodes have
resulted in reduced mortality, it remains unclear if this is, at least in part, a consequence
of the behavioral effect of Episode announcements as opposed to solely the biological
effect of the policy’s successful reduction in short-term spikes in PM10. Therefore, our
empirical strategy seeks to separate the behavioral effects of Episode announcements
from the total effect of the announcements on mortality. Adapting Neidell’s (2009)
model, the total effect of Episodes on mortality can be explained in the model below:
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éèåsãê+sx = w (ë*Mg (Å]+íèìrí) ∗ ãkè+ìã,îr(Å]+íèìrí), X)

(3.1)

In Equation (3.1) mortality is a function of exposure to PM10 concentrations, which is
represented by the interaction term ë*Mg (Å]+íèìrí) ∗ ãkè+ìã,îr(Å]+íèìrí). Also,
Equation (3.1) indicates that both ambient levels of pollution and behavioral responses to
pollution levels are a function of Episode announcements. Finally, from this relationship
it is evident that the effect of air pollution on mortality outcomes cannot be perfectly
explained by PM10 concentrations if individuals engage in behavior that limits or avoids
exposure, thereby reducing the effect. The term Z includes all other factor that affect
mortality (ie- temperature, pre-existing conditions, income, etc.). The total effect of
Episode announcements on mortality is given by:

ìéèåsãê+sx ïéèåsãê+sx ïë*Mg
ïéèåsãê+sx ïãkè+ìã,îr
=
∙
+
∙
ìÅ]+íèìr
ïë*Mg
ïÅ]+íèìr ïãkè+ìã,îr ïÅ]+íèìr

In Equation (3.2) the first term,

$ñóò@ôö?@Ñ
$õúùû

(3.2)

$õú

ùû
∙ $ül?†óf°
, is the biological effect on mortality

resulting from PM10 concentration reductions after Episode announcements. The second
$ñóò@ôö?@Ñ

term, $ô¢ó?fô£§° ∙

$ô¢ó?fô£§°
$ül?†óf°

, is the behavioral effect of Episode announcements. The

estimates from Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014) capture the total effect,

fñóò@ôö?@Ñ
fül?†óf°†

, while

we estimate only the behavioral effect.3

3

Since we use different treatment and control groups to identify the total effects and behavioral effects, our
behavioral effect estimates are not perfectly decomposed from the total effects estimates as suggested by
this model. This model is presented to provide a basis for our analysis, where ideally we could use the
same sample to identify both the total and behavioral effects.
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3.3.2.1 Total Effects of Episode Announcements
To estimate the total effect of Episode announcements on mortality, Mullins and
Bharadwaj (2014) use a two-part analysis. First, they establish an appropriate
counterfactual to Episodes announced in the post-PPDA period by matching pollution
and weather conditions on days immediately before an Episode announcement in the
post-PPDA period to observationally similar days (but not Episode announcements) in
the pre-PPDA period. Using the matched days in the pre-PPDA period as the control,
Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014) use a difference-in-differences (DID) model to isolate the
effect of Episodes on mortality controlling for mean PM10, weather and temporal fixed
effects. Since pollution and weather conditions are similar in 5-day intervals in both the
control and treatment groups, the differences in deaths following an Episode
announcement in the post-PPDA period should be due only to the Episode
announcement.
In the first part of our analysis, we replicate the results of Mullins and Bharadwaj
(2014) using a slightly different identification strategy from their original analysis. In our
paper the basis of our identification strategy for the total effects of Episode
announcements is that for which we use to identify the behavioral effects. To identify the
total effects of Episode announcements, we follow a similar identification strategy to the
one used to identify the behavioral effect of episodes described below in Section 3.2.2.
In order to compare the estimates from our behavioral effect analysis, it is crucial that we
employ consistent methods.
In estimating both the total effect and behavioral effect of announcements, we
restrict our sample to include only Episodes that occurred without another Episode
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announcement within five days before or after to avoid potential confounding factors
associated with consecutive Episode announcements. The Government of Chile
announced ninety-one episodes during the post-PPDA period; however, with the
restriction of stand-alone Episodes, our sample includes 35 of these Episodes.4
To ensure that any effects on mortality are a result of the Episode announcements,
the control group must also have experienced similar pollution and weather conditions in
the days leading up to an Episode in the post-PPDA period or what should have been in
Episode in the pre-PPDA period. Since there does exist periods of days that are exact
matches between the pre- and post-PPDA period, propensity score matching allows us to
identify similar matches (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). To estimate propensity scores,
we run a Logit model to predict the probability that an Episode is announced on any
given day based on PM10 concentrations and weather conditions in the five days before,
an Episode announcement. The specify the following model:

x@ = P + ∑ß^hM JQ^ ë*Mg @L^ + •¶bLa q^ K + ®©™¶b e + ´¨≠bÆ¶b m + S@

(3.3)

In Equation (3.3), x@ is an indicator that equals one if an Episode was announced on day t
in the post-PPDA period and equals zero if day t is a day in the pre-PPDA period.
ë*Mg @L^ is the daily mean PM10 concentration j days before day t, and •¶bLa is a vector of
observed weather variables j days before day t including a discretized measure of mean

4

Graff Zivin and Neidell’s (2009) results indicate that for consecutive Episode announcements, observed
behavioral responses are typical most prevalent only on the first day of announcement, which suggests that
using only stand-alone Episodes would capture the strongest effect of avoidance behavior on Episode
announcements.
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temperature (mean temperature is rounded to the nearest multiple of five), average wind
speed and precipitation. ®©™@ and ´¨≠bÆ@ are day-of-week and month-level fixed
effects, respectively. We include the day-of-week fixed effects to account for potential
dependence of Episode announcements on the day-of-week while monthly fixed effects
are included to capture seasonal variation in weather patterns and potentially Episode
announcements. P, Q^ , q^ , e and m are estimated coefficients, and S@ is the error term.
Using the coefficients estimated by the Logit model, we plug the observed values
for each pre- and post-PPDA episode into the model to obtain predicted values of x@ ,
which is the propensity score for day t. We use a five Nearest Neighbor matching
approach to identify the five closet matches of days in the post-PPDA period to days in
the pre-PPDA period. Including multiple matches reduces variance; however, larger
values of n-Nearest Neighbors can reduce the quality of the matches. To further ensure
quality of matches, we include only matches with a common support, which results in
dropping one post-PPDA Episode, and our final sample for the difference-in-difference
regressions includes 34 out of 35 post-PPDA events (Heckman, LaLonde and Smith
1999).
Table 3.2 compares the means of the pollution and weather variables in the five
days before an Episode in the control and treatment groups.
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Table 3.2: Balance table comparing means for treatment and control groups matching on
pollution and weather in the five days prior to an Episode announcement.
t-test for
Means
Equal Means
Lag
Variable
Treated
Control
Percent
t-stat
p-value
Bias
-5
PM10
90.22
90.83
-1.5
-0.08
0.94
-4
PM10
85.18
87.56
-5.7
-0.31
0.76
-3
PM10
93.83
92.08
3.7
0.19
0.85
-2
PM10
129.99
127.41
5.8
0.25
0.80
-1
PM10
133.42
140.31
-15.9
-0.63
0.53
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1

Discrete Temp.
Discrete Temp.
Discrete Temp.
Discrete Temp.
Discrete Temp.

48.82
48.82
47.65
47.94
49.12

48.38
48.29
47.18
47.47
48.50

6.7
8.4
7.2
6.7
9.6

0.29
0.35
0.29
0.28
0.40

0.78
0.73
0.77
0.78
0.69

-5
-4
-3
-2
-1

Wind Speed
Wind Speed
Wind Speed
Wind Speed
Wind Speed

3.07
3.63
3.51
2.63
2.70

3.09
3.67
3.66
2.80
2.67

-1.2
-3.4
-11.5
-14.2
2.2

-0.06
-0.15
-0.42
-0.68
0.11

0.96
0.88
0.67
0.50
0.91

-5
-4
-3
-2
-1

Precipitation
Precipitation
Precipitation
Precipitation
Precipitation

0.03
0.05
0.07
0.00
0.00

0.02
0.03
0.07
0.00
0.00

9.6
12.7
-1.3
1.9
0

0.42
0.51
-0.04
0.56
0

0.68
0.61
0.97
0.58
1.00

34

106

Observations

Table 3.2, along with Figure 3.2, supports that our matches do have observationally
similar PM10 concentrations across the compared days. Additionally, Figure 3.2,
demonstrates that while pollution conditions in the matched days are similar in the five
days leading up to an Episode announcement in the post-PPDA period, PM10
concentrations are significantly higher on the day of and five days following an Episode
announcement in the matched days.
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of daily mean PM10 levels for treatment and control groups
matching on pollution and weather in the five days prior to an Episode announcement.

After identifying the treatment and control groups, we implement the DID
regressions to compare the difference in PM10 concentrations and mortality outcomes in
the five days following an Episode to the five days following a matched non-Episode to
identify the effect of information.5 The DID approach allows us to appropriately
compare PM10 and mortality outcomes in the treatment and control groups by controlling
for systematic differences between the groups. This strategy first differences the
mortality outcomes for days before and after an Episode (treatment group) or nonEpisode (control group), and the difference between these two groups gives the effect of

5

While the outcome of interest in this paper is changes in mortality in response to Episode announcements,
we assess the impacts on PM10 to ensure our replication of Mullins and Bharadwaj’s (2014) results are
consistent with their findings.
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an Episode announcement on mortality outcomes. To further control for systematic
differences between the treatment and control groups, we include weights from the
matching procedure in the DID regressions (Hirano and Imbens 2001; Imbens 2004).
We run the DID regressions on six different samples, where each sample captures
the effect on PM10 or mortality on the day of an Episode up to five days after, for which
each sample includes one day before an Episode (t=-1) and one day of or after (t = 0, 1, 2,
3, 4, or 5). For instance, the first regression captures the difference in mortality between
the day of an Episode and the day prior. The second regression examines the difference
in mortality between the day after an Episode and the day prior, and so on. The sixth
regression represents the difference in mortality between five days after an Episode and
the day prior. Additionally, we examine ten different mortality outcomes: all ages for all
causes of death, all ages for deaths caused by respiratory illnesses, all ages for deaths
caused by circulatory illnesses, all ages for deaths caused by cancer, all ages for deaths
caused by accidents, and all of the above but for a subsample of the population over 64.
Therefore, we estimate 66 regressions in total: 6 to identify the PM10 impacts and 60 to
identify the effects on mortality. Using ordinary least squares, the DID specification for
the 66 regressions is:

(U?,@ − U?,LM ) = P + ∞ ∗ Å? + ∑ß^hM±•¶`La q^ ≤ + ∑@µhg(•¶`á≥ ¥µ ) + ®©™¶ ? e + ´¨≠bÆ¶ ? m +
S?,@

(3.4)

Equation (3.4) i indicates the date of an Episode (in the treatment group) or matched day
(in the control group). t is the distance of the sample observation from the associated
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event i, where t can take the values 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5. U?,LM is the PM10 or mortality
outcome for t set equal to the day before event i, and the term (U?,@ − U?,LM ) is the
difference between the PM10 or mortality outcome for t=0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 and day t=-1.
Å? is an indicator that equals one if the observed day is associated with an Episode that
occurred in the post-PPDA period and zero if the observed day is a day in the pre-PPDA
period. The term, ∑ß^hM±•′`La q^ ≤ + ∑@µhg(•¶bá≥ ¥µ ), is a vector of observed pollution and
weather conditions for the five days preceding event i up day t. The PM10 regressions
include mean temperature, average wind speed and precipitation, while the mortality
regressions include the afore mentioned controls in addition to mean PM10
concentrations. As in the Logit model, ®©™? and ´¨≠bÆ? are day-of-week and monthlevel fixed effects, respectively. P, ∞, ∑, V, Q^ , q^ , ∏µ , ¥µ , e and m are estimated
coefficients and S?@ is the error term.

3.3.2.2 Behavioral Effects of Episode Announcements
Our analysis to identify the behavioral effects of Episode announcements is
similar to the analysis described above to identify the total effects of Episode
announcements. Identification of the behavioral effects, however, requires the inclusion
of additional controls in the estimation of the propensity scores. We now match periods
including the days immediately leading up to, the day of, and the days immediately after
an Episode announcement to days with observationally similar PM10 concentrations and
weather conditions occurring in the pre-PPDA period. Using these new propensity scores,
we estimate DID models to compare the difference in mortality outcomes in the days
following an Episode to days following a matched non-Episode to identify the effect of
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information. Since PM10 is held constant across the treatment and control groups, any
differences in health outcomes following an Episode reflects differential exposure to
PM10 as a result of individuals’ choices to about their outdoor activities in response to the
provided information.
To estimate the propensity scores, we specify the following Logit model:

x@ = P + ∑ß^hM JQ^ ∗ ë*Mg @L^ + •¶bLa q^ K + ∑ßµhg±∏µ ∗ ë*Mg @áµ + •¶bá≥ ¥µ ≤ + ®©™′@ +
´¨≠bÆ′@ m + S@

(3.5)

The variables in Equation (3.5) are identical to Equation (3.3) with the addition of the
term, ∑ßµhg±∏µ ∗ ë*Mg @áµ + •¶bá≥ ¥µ ≤. Holding pollution constant before and after an
Episode announcement requires that we match on both the days prior to an Episode, the
day of and the days after. Therefore, ë*10@áµ is the daily mean PM10 concentration k
days after day t and •¶bá≥ is a vector of observed weather variables k days after day t
including a discretized measure of mean temperature (mean temperature is rounded to the
nearest multiple of five), average wind speed and precipitation. P, Q^ , q^ , ∏µ , ¥µ , e and m
are estimated coefficients, and S@ is the error term.
After obtaining the propensity scores (the predicted values from the Equation
(3.5)), as in the previous analysis described in Section 3.2.1, we use the Nearest Neighbor
approach to identify the five closet matches of days in the post-PPDA period to days in
the pre-PPDA period and include only matches with a common support. This results in
dropping eight out 35 post-PPDA Episodes, and our final sample for the difference-indifference regressions includes 27 post-PPDA events.
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Table 3.3 compares the mean PM10 concentrations in the five days before, day of,
and five days after an Episode in the control (Episode days) and treatment groups
(matched non-Episode days). See Table B.2 in Appendix B in the Appendix for
comparison of the other covariates between the control and treated groups. Table 3.3,
along with Figure 3.3, provides supports that our matches do have observationally similar
PM10 concentrations across the compared days.

Table 3.3: Balance table comparing means for PM10 concentrations for treatment and
control groups matching on pollution and weather in the five days prior, day of and five
days after an Episode announcement.
t-test for
Means
Equal Means
Lag/Lead
Variable
Treated
Control
Percent
t-stat
p-value
Bias
-5
PM10
96.34
95.71
1.5
0.08
0.94
-4
PM10
89.20
87.90
3.1
0.14
0.89
-3
PM10
97.53
101.22
-7.7
-0.30
0.76
-2
PM10
129.94
139.07
-20.6
-0.71
0.48
-1
PM10
129.42
127.82
3.7
0.11
0.91
0
PM10
102.85
100.07
6.8
0.24
0.81
1
PM10
92.06
99.80
-17.3
-0.70
0.48
2
PM10
88.38
96.09
-16.0
-0.74
0.46
3
PM10
92.41
94.83
-5.2
-0.23
0.82
4
PM10
94.47
98.80
-9.3
-0.43
0.67
5
PM10
93.89
98.51
-10.1
-0.48
0.63
Observations

27

64

80

Figure 3.3: Comparison of daily mean PM10 levels for treatment and control groups
matching on pollution and weather in the five days prior, day of and five days after an
Episode announcement.

Like the analysis in the previous section, we use the identified treatment and
control groups from the propensity matching to estimate 66 DID regressions: 6 to identify
the PM10 impacts and 60 to identify the effects on mortality. Recall that we run the DID
regressions on six different samples, where each sample captures the effect on PM10 or
mortality on the day of an Episode up to five days after, for which each sample includes
one day before an Episode (t=-1) and one day of or after (t = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5).6 We
examine the same ten different mortality outcomes as listed in Section 3.2.1. Since our

6

Again, the outcome of interest in this paper is changes in mortality in response to Episode
announcements, we estimate same regressions as in Section 3.2.1 using differences in PM10 as the
dependent variables as an additional check that PM10 concentrations are in fact held constant between the
treatment and control groups.
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identification strategy for the behavioral effects is the same as the total effects, we
estimate the DID specified exactly as Equation (3.4) presented in Section 3.2.1. The
analysis to determine the behavioral effects; however, uses a different sample of treated
and control days based on the earlier differences in the matching process.
3.4. Results and Discussion
3.4.1 Effects of Episode Announcements on PM10 Concentrations
We first present our results of the total and behavioral effects of Episode
announcements on PM10 concentrations. The first column in Table 3.4 shows the total
effect of Episode announcements on PM10 concentrations on the day of and five days
after an announcement. The second column shows the behavioral effect of Episode
announcements on PM10 concentrations on the day of and five days after an
announcement. While the effects on PM10 concentrations are not the focus of this paper,
Table 3.4 demonstrates two important results. First, column 1 demonstrates that our
replicated results are consistent with the total effects of Episodes on PM10 concentrations
presented by Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014). We similarly find that on the day of an
Episode and in the five days after, PM10 concentrations are significant reduced. The
magnitudes of the coefficients are also similar to those of Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014).
Second, column 2 supports that PM10 concentrations are in fact held constant between
the treatment and control groups on the day of and 5 days after an Episode as none of the
estimates are statistically significant.
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Table 3.4: Differences-in-differences results: Effect of Episodes on mean PM10
concentrations.
Total Effects
Analysis
Difference from Day -1 to Day of Episode
Difference from Day -1 to Day 1
Difference from Day -1 to Day 2
Difference from Day -1 to Day 3
Difference from Day -1 to Day 4
Difference from Day -1 to Day 5

Behavioral Effects
Analysis

-16.527**
(6.50)
-31.037***
(8.70)
-21.905**
(9.15)
-22.033**
(9.24)
-20.766**
(9.19)

5.563
(7.34)
-2.037
(8.72)
-3.819
(10.51)
3.345
(10.95)
2.805
(9.39)

-33.351***
(9.17)

-4.369
(8.97)

Pre-Episode Daily Mean
N
Treatment
Control

106.527
140
34
106

108.484
91
27
64

* - significant at 0.10; **- significant at 0.05; ***- significant at 0.0

3.4.2 Total Effects of Episode Announcements
Table 3.5 summarizes the results from our replication of Mullins and Bharadwaj’s
(2014) estimates of the total effects of Episode announcements on mortality by cause-ofdeath and age group. Each cell in Table 3.5 is a coefficient (the coefficient of interest
from Equation (3.4), ∞) from a different regression and includes mortality outcomes for a
subpopulation of individuals over 64, which represents a more health-sensitive group to
pollution spikes. The coefficient estimates in Columns 1 and 6 are consistent with main
conclusions from Mullins and Bharadwaj’s (2014) analysis that deaths, particularly
among the elderly, are reduced as a result of Episode announcements.
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Table 3.5: Total effects of episode announcements on deaths by cause-of-death and age group.

Cum. All

Deaths All Ages
Cum.
Cum.
Cum.
Respiratory Circulatory Cancer

Difference from Day
-1 to Day of Episode

-10.069***

-0.873

-2.217

-3.326**

0.925

-5.179**

-0.059

-1.756

-2.375

0.695*

(3.08)

(1.56)

(2.21)

(1.55)

(0.81)

(2.55)

(1.31)

(1.79)

(1.59)

(0.42)

Difference from Day
-1 to Day 1

-22.023***

-3.958

-8.076*

-6.065

1.592

-14.460***

-3.307

-7.161**

-2.921

1.459*

(5.95)

(2.68)

(4.07)

(4.29)

(1.71)

(5.14)

(2.27)

(3.39)

(3.89)

(0.86)

Difference from Day
-1 to Day 2

-23.477***

-6.282

-11.126*

-6.484

1.859

-15.737**

-6.046*

-8.854*

-2.473

2.621**

(8.17)

(3.96)

(6.02)

(5.57)

(2.85)

(6.75)

(3.30)

(5.03)

(4.71)

(1.28)

Difference from Day
-1 to Day 3

-28.755**

-12.183**

-15.614*

-6.595

0.792

-22.474**

-12.679**

-13.009*

-2.239

4.196**

(11.68)

(5.81)

(8.22)

(7.83)

(3.68)

(9.81)

(5.29)

(7.01)

(7.49)

(1.84)

Difference from Day
-1 to Day 4

-44.555***

-15.047**

-26.150**

-4.948

1.320

-33.354***

-14.935**

-19.244**

-1.124

4.052*

(15.29)

(6.79)

(10.05)

(8.99)

(4.76)

(12.59)

(6.12)

(9.32)

(8.72)

(2.29)

Difference from Day
-1 to Day 5

-54.559***

-18.564**

-23.253*

-1.008

1.295

-42.955***

-19.799**

-17.023

3.206

4.414*

(18.69)

(8.38)

(13.53)

(10.73)

(5.34)

(15.67)

(7.91)

(12.76)

(9.25)

(2.63)

64.641
132
34
98

10.971
106
34
72

22.365
106
34
72

13.282
106
34
72

Pre-Episode Daily
94.229
12.718
27.624
N
132
106
106
Mean
Treatment
34
34
34
Control
98
72
72
* - significant at 0.10; **- significant at 0.05; ***- significant at 0.01

20.412
106
34
72

Cum.
Accidental

4.435
106
34
72
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Cum. All

Deaths Age Over 64
Cum.
Cum.
Cum.
Respirator Circulatory Cancer
y

Cum.
Accidental

1.082
106
34
72

Our estimates, however, are generally of larger magnitude and of greater statistical
significance than those of Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014), especially the impacts of
Episodes on respiratory and circulatory deaths. Since we expect PM10 to have the most
immediate impact of respiratory and circulatory systems, these results fit with our
understanding of how exposure to PM10 can be harmful and therefore how avoidance of
PM10 might reduce mortality. Additionally, that we find little impact of Episodes on
cancer deaths suggests death reductions can be attributed to PM10 reductions as cancer
deaths should be the least responsive to air quality improvements in the short-term.
Finally, unlike Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014), Table 3.5 also shows statistically
significant increases in accidental deaths among the elderly. An increase in accidental
deaths, particular among the elderly, could be a result of higher levels of public transport
and street sweeping are provided, leading to increased pedestrian related accidents.
These types of accidents are much more likely to lead to death than accidents between
cars, especially in urban environments where traffic speeds generally aren't that high.
While our analysis preserves the main conclusions from Mullins and Bharadwaj’s
(2014) analysis, the differences in the magnitude and significance of the estimates should
be due to the additional controls implemented in our regression specifications. Mullins
and Bharadwaj (2014) control only for pollution and weather in the five days prior to an
Episode announcement or matched day in the pre-PPDA period. However, given that our
dependent variable captures differences in PM10 and mortality up to five days after an
Episode, it is important to control for pollution and weather conditions before an
Episodes and on all other days for which pollution and mortality outcomes are being
considered (see Equation (3.4)).
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Of final note, recall that the effects presented in Table 3.5 capture the net effect of
Episodes and do not identify the effects of any avoidance behaviors undertaken in
response to pollution information. Therefore, these estimates are the basis for our
analysis of the behavioral effects, which we discuss in the following section.

3.4.3 Behavioral Effects of Episode Announcements
Tables 3.6 summarizes our main results, the behavioral effects of Episode
announcements on mortality by cause-of-death and age group. Each cell in Table 3.6 is a
coefficient (the coefficient of interest from Equation (3.4), !) from a different regression
and includes mortality outcomes for a subpopulation of individuals over 64, which
represents a more health-sensitive group to pollution spikes. In Table 3.6, we see
significantly fewer deaths in the five days following an Episode announcement compared
to when an Episode is not announced holding PM10 constant. The coefficients are
statistically significant and negative for deaths among the general population.
That deaths in particular are significantly lower in the treatment group (Episodes
were announced in response to pollution spikes) compared to the control (Episodes were
not announced in response to pollution spikes) suggests individuals are experiencing less
pollutant exposure. Because days in the treatment and control groups have the same
PM10 concentrations, the differences in mortality outcomes following an Episode
announcement are not attributable to different ambient PM10 levels but instead to the
information content of the Episode and the resulting avoidance behavior that is
undertaken. Our results support that individual avoid outdoor activities in response to the
Episode information and getting near-zero PM10 exposure as opposed to some PM10

86

exposure. Average PM10 levels after an episode and on matched days are between 85-100
µg/m3 (see Figure 3.3). As the WHO guideline for PM10 is 50 µg/m3 (WHO 2011),
going outside after an episode could still be harmful, and we might not see significant
reductions in death even due to episodes if individuals are not engaging in avoidance
behavior. Additionally, examining the cause of death results, we find some reductions in
respiratory related deaths among the general population and elderly in the first two day
following an Episode announcement. The coefficients on circulatory and cancer deaths
are generally statistically insignificant.
Although these behavioral effects are not a direct decomposition of the total
effects presented in Section 4.2, we can compare the magnitudes of the coefficients for
the estimated behavioral effects relative to the total effects. The magnitude of the
coefficients on the behavioral effects are nearly equal to the total effects on the day of
and first couple of days after an Episode announcement. These results demonstrate, first,
that information is a crucial component of the PPDA in mortality reduction. In fact,
given the significant reductions in PM10 concentrations as a result of Episode
announcements (see column 1 of Table 3.4), that a large proportion of the reductions in
mortality seem to be a result of avoidance behavior highlights that information may be
even more important than it appears ex-ante. Second, our results suggest that individuals
do respond to information on air pollution, but the health benefits of undertaking
avoidance behaviors are largely realized on the day of a first couple of days after an
Episode announcement.
Finally, holding pollution constant, Episode announcements still result in
statistically significant increases in accidental deaths among the elderly on the day of and
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two days after an Episode announcement. As mentioned above, this could be a result of
increased pedestrian related accidents due to a city-wide efforts and policy-mandates to
discourage vehicle usage. However, that these effects only persist for a few days after
controlling for pollution, further supports that if individuals are changing their driving
behaviors, these behaviors last for only a short time after an announcement. If most of
these accidental deaths can be attributed to pedestrian-related incidents, an increase in
accidental does not necessarily mean that more people are going outside, and therefore do
not contradict that individuals are not undertaking avoidance behaviors in response to
Episode announcements. Additionally, since homes often present many hazards that
cause accidental deaths, the increase in accidental deaths could also be indicating that
individuals are staying at home more on days following an Episode announcement.
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Table 3.6: Behavioral effects of episode announcements on deaths by cause-of-death and age group.

Cum. All

Deaths All Ages
Cum.
Cum.
Cum.
Respiratory Circulatory Cancer

Difference from Day
-1 to Day of Episode

-8.980***

-3.048**

1.033

-1.128

0.314

-4.483

-2.767**

1.630

-0.310

1.196***

(3.30)

(1.48)

(3.00)

(2.25)

(1.21)

(2.84)

(1.33)

(2.88)

(2.24)

(0.44)

Difference from Day
-1 to Day 1

-18.465***

-6.490**

0.944

-0.799

0.325

-11.599*

-6.255**

1.643

0.392

2.046**

(6.50)

(3.04)

(4.50)

(4.69)

(2.52)

(6.15)

(2.49)

(3.95)

(4.77)

(0.92)

Difference from Day
-1 to Day 2

-24.534***

-4.713

-0.259

4.012

0.409

-15.185**

-5.030

0.455

4.271

3.490**

(8.43)

(3.89)

(6.85)

(6.99)

(3.67)

(7.44)

(3.59)

(6.00)

(7.34)

(1.50)

Difference from Day
-1 to Day 3

-21.692**

-2.853

-6.340

3.120

-0.279

-16.264*

-5.618

-4.832

2.258

3.092

(10.43)

(4.69)

(8.40)

(9.01)

(5.42)

(9.53)

(4.72)

(7.42)

(10.40)

(2.05)

Difference from Day
-1 to Day 4

-32.790**

-1.936

-14.157*

-1.076

-0.032

-25.821**

-4.760

-10.444

1.207

3.324

(13.22)

(6.26)

(7.48)

(11.11)

(7.29)

(11.55)

(4.20)

(7.17)

(11.05)

(2.75)

Difference from Day
-1 to Day 5

-23.086

14.326

-10.981

5.981

-1.742

-22.292*

5.783

-12.769

18.084

1.696

(13.72)

(10.62)

(13.12)

(12.39)

(7.74)

(13.00)

(6.47)

(11.00)

(12.68)

(2.30)

62.281
83
27
56

10.711
68
27
41

Pre-Episode Daily
91.511
12.504
26.252
N
83
68
68
Mean
Treatment
27
27
27
Control
56
41
41
* - significant at 0.10; **- significant at 0.05; ***- significant at 0.01

20.185
68
27
41

Cum.
Accidental

4.156
68
27
41
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Cum. All

Deaths Age Over 64
Cum.
Cum.
Cum.
Respirator Circulatory Cancer
y

21.363
68
27
41

13.111
68
27
41

Cum.
Accidental

0.956
68
27
41

3.5. Conclusion
As improving air quality around the world continues to be both vital and urgent,
understanding the mechanisms of effective policy interventions is equally important. The
Chilean PPDA offers promise that short-term spikes in air pollution can be mitigated
along with the associated mortality effects. With the announcement of Episodes on days
projected to exceed pollution thresholds, the PPDA in effect works on two dimensions- it
restricts pollution-generating activities and provides information to the public about
environmental risk.
In this paper we decompose Mullins and Bharadwaj’s (2014) estimates of the total
effects of Episode announcements on mortality to separate the behavioral effects based
on provided information from the pure biological effects of PM10 concentration
reductions. While Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014) find that Episodes significantly reduce
mortality, our results suggest that a large portion of such reductions are due to avoidance
behaviors on the day of and couple of days following an Episode only. The remaining
mortality effects, which Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014) find last up to five days after an
Episode occurrence, then appear to be mostly a result of improvements in air quality.
These findings have strong implications for policymakers in thinking about the
value of information. Our study, along with others, suggests that individuals do pay
attention to public information and respond by changing their behavior. Especially when
health outcomes are of concern, it may be possible to design policies with relatively low
enforcement costs by disseminating information to the public.
Along these lines, however, an area for future research is the investigation of the
relationship between public announcements on consecutive days and behavioral

90

responses. Our paper focuses only on stand-alone Episodes and does not analyze the
behavioral responses when Episodes are announced on consecutive days. Given that it
becomes increasingly costly to substitute away from outdoor activities (or continue other
exposure reducing behaviors) over periods of days relative to one day, it is possible that
behavioral responses may diminish across consecutive announcements (as Graff Zivin
and Neidell (2009) find is the case with smog alerts in Los Angeles). This is also
suggested by our results with the diminishing reductions in mortality in the days
following an Episode announcement after holding pollution constant. In the case of the
PPDA in which Episodes are frequently announced consecutively, it is important to
identify the length of time over which the behavioral effect of Episodes is effective.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
Table A.1: Timeline of selected events following the Deepwater Horizon well explosion.
Date
Event
April 20
Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion in the Macondo
Prospect.
April 24
Spill responders estimate oil is leaking at a rate of 1,000
barrels per day.
April 28
Spill responders estimate that oil is leaking at a rate of 5,000
barrels per day.
April 29-30
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida declare states
of emergency.
April 30
First oil washes up in Louisiana.
May 2
Government begins federal fishery closures.
May 6-7
BP's effort to contain the well with a cofferdam fails.
May 12
BP releases first public video of leak, prompting new flow
rate estimates.
May 26-28
BP's second attempt to kill the well fails.
May 27
Investigators announce a lower bound estimate of 12,00025,000 barrels leaking per day. Scientists announce spill is
bigger than the Exxon Valdez.
June 4
Tar balls seen on beaches in Pensacola, Florida.
June 10
Flow rate estimate increases to 25,000 -30,000 barrels per
day.
June 14
Florida announces its first state fishery closure.
June 15
President Obama discusses spill in first Oval Office address.
June 25- July 2
Hurricane Alex causes abandoned efforts and more oil
onshore.
June 28
Escambia County, Florida issues a health advisory for
Pensacola beaches.
July 2
NOAA releases report predicting future oil wash-ups on
Gulf coast shorelines.
July 15
BP caps the well, stopping the oil leak.
July 22-24
Tropical Storm Bonnie leads to clean-up crew evacuations.
August 4
BP announces static kill is successful.
August 4
Government releases report detailing the current status of
the fate of leaked oil.
September 19
BP completes relief well, shutting down the Macondo well.
Sources: Florida SERT (2017); National Hurricane Center (2017); Graham et al. (2011); Biello (2010);
CNN (2010); NOAA (2010); Time Magazine (2010).
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Table A.2: Regression results for identification of treatment period.
Variables
Impact on ln (Price)
Coastal zone sale February 2010
-0.0046
(0.0349)
Coastal zone sale March 2010
-0.0095
(0.0269)
Coastal zone sale April 2010
-0.0229
(0.0207)
Coastal zone sale May 2010
-0.0005
(0.0214)
Coastal zone sale June 2010
0.0026
(0.0264)
Coastal zone sale July 2010
-0.0262
(0.0338)
Coastal zone sale August 2010
-0.0528*
(0.0314)
Coastal zone sale September 2010
-0.0821***
(0.0312)
Coastal zone sale October 2010
-0.0345
(0.0400)
Coastal zone sale November 2010
-0.0286
(0.0285)
Coastal zone sale December 2010
-0.0158
(0.0237)
Coastal zone sale January 2011
0.0328
(0.0422)
Tract Fixed Effects

Y

Year Fixed Effects

Y

Month-of-Year Fixed Effects

Y

Observations

112,312

Adj. R2
0.7831
*** - significant at 0.01; **- significant at 0.05; *- significant at 0.10
Robust Standard Errors are Clustered by Census Tract in Parenthesis ( )
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of sale prices in 2014 dollars. Additional
controls include the age of the home at the time of sale, a quadratic term for age of sale, the
total number of bathrooms, the natural log of interior square footage, the natural log of the
parcel size, an indicator for the presence of a pool, the distance to the nearest urban cluster in
kilometers, the distance to the nearest primary road in kilometers, an indicator for location on
the waterfront, an indicator for coastal zone, and monthly indicators for the months shown above.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
Table B.1: Temporary plans and restrictions implemented according to PPDA Episodes.
Episode Level
Alert

Protocols
-Use restriction on vehicles w/o catalytic converters: 40% week, 20% weekends
-No use of uncertified residential wood or biomass heating

Pre-Emergency

-Use restriction on vehicles w/o catalytic converters: 60% week, 40% weekends
-Use restrictions on vehicles with catalytic converters: 20% all days
-Operation ban on stationary emissions sources contributing 30% of total
stationary emissions of particulate matter

PM10>195 µg/m3

PM10>240 µg/m3

-Potential suspension of Physical Education classes community sports
-More intense traffic and public transportation plans in effect
-Stricter enforcement on mobile & stationary sources of air pollution
-Increased street sweeping and cleaning activities
-Increased Metro service
-No use of uncertified residential wood or biomass heating
Emergency
PM10>330 µg/m3

-Use restriction on vehicles w/o catalytic converters: 80% week, 60% weekends
-Use restrictions on vehicles with catalytic converters: 40% all days
-Operation ban on stationary emissions sources contributing 50% of total
stationary emissions of particulate matter
-Potential suspension of Physical Education classes community sports
-More intense traffic and public transportation plans in effect
-Stricter enforcement on mobile & stationary sources of air pollution
-Increased street sweeping and cleaning activities
-Increased Metro service
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Table B.2: Balance table comparing means for other covariates for treatment and control
groups matching on pollution and weather in the five days prior, day of and five days
after an Episode announcement.
t-test for
Means
Equal Means
Lag/Lead
Variable
Treated
Control
Percent
t-stat
p-value
Bias
-5
Discrete Temp. 49.63
51.48
-28.0
-1.12
0.27
-4
Discrete Temp. 49.82
51.89
-32.7
-1.33
0.19
-3
Discrete Temp. 48.70
50.37
-25.3
-1.01
0.32
-2
Discrete Temp. 49.26
50.96
-24.4
-0.93
0.36
-1
Discrete Temp. 49.63
51.44
-28.1
-0.96
0.34
0
Discrete Temp. 50.56
51.30
-11.8
-0.46
0.65
1
Discrete Temp. 49.44
50.59
-18.6
-0.73
0.47
2
Discrete Temp. 49.63
50.74
-17.9
-0.60
0.55
3
Discrete Temp. 49.63
51.52
-30.2
-1.13
0.27
4
Discrete Temp. 49.82
51.85
-29.8
-1.07
0.29
5
Discrete Temp. 49.26
51.44
-34.6
-1.21
0.23
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5

Wind Speed
Wind Speed
Wind Speed
Wind Speed
Wind Speed
Wind Speed
Wind Speed
Wind Speed
Wind Speed
Wind Speed
Wind Speed

3.18
3.75
3.69
2.85
2.78
3.44
3.50
3.59
3.42
3.63
3.39

3.24
3.74
3.52
2.76
3.08
3.52
3.56
3.69
3.28
3.80
3.41

-5.0
0.4
12.7
7.7
-25.4
-6.5
-5.6
-8.0
10.6
-15.1
-1.8

-0.21
0.02
0.44
0.38
-1.16
-0.27
-0.22
-0.30
0.39
-0.48
-0.07

0.84
0.99
0.66
0.71
0.25
0.79
0.82
0.77
0.70
0.63
0.95

-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5

Precipitation
Precipitation
Precipitation
Precipitation
Precipitation
Precipitation
Precipitation
Precipitation
Precipitation
Precipitation
Precipitation

0.02
0.05
0.08
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.02

0.02
0.06
0.07
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01

0.9
-7.1
6.5
2.7
0
-10.2
-6.7
2.1
6.1
9.8
15.4

0.05
-0.20
0.21
0.44
0
-0.41
-0.30
0.13
0.37
0.57
0.90

0.96
0.84
0.84
0.66
1.00
0.69
0.77
0.90
0.71
0.57
0.37

27

64

Observations
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